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INTRODUCTION 
During the oral arguments in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor commented that it would seem as if the Supreme 
Court had “imbued a creature of State law,” the corporation, “with human 
characteristics.”1 In Citizens United, the Court ruled that the First Amend-
ment prohibited restrictions on political speech of corporations.2 Like no 
other prior decision, Citizens United elevated the importance of the question 
whether corporations and other types of organizations can assert constitu-
tional rights. That was until the Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., in which three for-profit closely held corporations challenged 
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act of 2010.3 In Hobby 
Lobby, at oral arguments, Justice Kennedy posited: “You say profit corpora-
tions just don’t have any standing to vindicate the religious rights of their 
shareholders and owners.”4 Yet in its decision, the Court did not address the 
standing requirements directly, stating that because corporations protect 
those “associated with a corporation in one way or another,” a for-profit firm 
can assert free exercise rights and can itself claim to have sincere “religious 
beliefs.”5 
Are corporations “persons” with standing to assert constitutional rights? 
The Court in Citizens United gingerly avoided addressing the issue directly; 
 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 
(2010) (No. 08-205).  
2 130 S. Ct. 876, 903 (2010).  
3 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).  
4 Transcript of Oral Argument at 75, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (No. 13-354).  
5 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768, 2774, 2779. 
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and in Hobby Lobby, the Court avoided the First Amendment issue, relying 
instead on statutory rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993 while evading the question of corporate standing. As I will explore in 
this Article, real missteps in both decisions could have been avoided by 
directly addressing these questions. Corporations and other types of 
organizations have long exercised a range of constitutional rights, including 
those found under the Contracts Clause,6 Due Process Clause,7 Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection Clause,8 First Amendment,9 Fourth Amend-
ment,10 Fifth Amendment Takings and Double Jeopardy Clauses,11 Sixth 
Amendment,12 and Seventh Amendment.13  
Corporate constitutional litigation is pervasive. While perhaps the most 
significant, Citizens United and Hobby Lobby are by no means the only recent 
high-profile constitutional cases involving corporate litigants. Take a few 
prominent examples: (1) shareholders of AIG filed two derivative actions 
claiming that during the global financial crisis, the government’s bailout of 
AIG was a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment;14 (2) the Southern 
Union Corporation successfully won a Supreme Court victory asserting its 
Sixth Amendment right to have aggravating facts proven to a jury when 
prosecuted for environmental crimes;15 and (3) the Court held that the 
Goodyear Dunlop Corporation’s subsidiaries in Turkey, France, and Luxembourg 
 
6 See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638-39 (1819) (finding 
that state law unconstitutionally interfered with an organization’s contractual rights). 
7 See Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (recognizing cor-
porations receive protection for the “enjoyment of property,” including the ability to challenge 
“legislation injuriously affecting it”). 
8 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985) (citing the “well established” 
Equal Protection Clause rights of corporations); Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 
394, 396 (1886) (noting that the Court agreed that the Equal Protection Clause applied to 
corporations at issue). 
9 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 903 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political 
speech restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”). 
10 See Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 325 (1978) (declaring a statute unconstitutional 
because it violated the corporation’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from warrantless search). 
11 See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575 (1977) (assuming corpora-
tions are protected by Double Jeopardy Clause rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 
282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (discussing the Takings Clause as applied to a foreign corporation). 
12 See S. Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2351-52 (2012) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment can protect a corporation from criminal fines). 
13 See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (holding that in a derivative shareholder 
action, shareholders possess the same right to trial by jury as a corporation). 
14 See Starr Int’l Co. v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 906 F. Supp. 2d 202, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(dismissing complaint except for the takings claim, which was withdrawn); Starr Int’l Co. v. 
United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 50, 71 ( 2012) (finding plaintiffs stated a certain Fifth Amendment 
takings claim). 
15 See S. Union Co., 132 S. Ct. at 2354, 2357. 
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were not “essentially at home” in North Carolina under its Due Process 
Clause test for general jurisdiction.16 Those constitutional claims have little 
in common with each other, but just those examples indicate the sheer 
breadth and importance of corporate constitutional litigation. 
Responding to the long list of corporate constitutional rights the 
Supreme Court has already recognized, Justice Stevens went one step 
further in his Citizens United dissent to note “[u]nder the majority’s view, I 
suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not 
permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of 
speech.”17 Justice Stevens suggested, no doubt tongue in cheek, that having 
recognized First Amendment rights, the Court would be obligated for the 
sake of consistency to extend all other constitutional rights to corporations. 
The Court has not extended all constitutional rights to corporations or to 
organizations more generally, such as associations, partnerships, and limited 
liability companies. Corporations cannot vote, and the Court has ruled that 
they are not citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment.18 Corporations lack 
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights,19 Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities Clause rights,20 and Due Process Clause liberty rights.21 Some 
constitutional rights are individual-centered and not plausible as rights of 
corporations. Unsurprisingly, courts have not recognized a right of corpora-
tions to serve on juries, run for public office, marry, procreate, or travel.  
What theory explains why corporations have some constitutional rights 
and not others? The Supreme Court has not offered a general theory. The 
closest the Court has come to touching the third rail of this jurisprudence 
was to suggest that certain “purely personal” constitutional rights cannot be 
exercised by corporations.22 Even when the Court recognizes that a corpora-
tion does enjoy a constitutional right, it generally does so without discus-
sion. In Citizens United, for example, the Court did not discuss whether a 
corporation is a pure creature of state law, as Justice Sotomayor suggested; a 
 
16 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
17 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
18 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) (“The term citizens [in the Four-
teenth Amendment] applies only to natural persons, . . . not to artificial persons created by the 
legislature . . . .”). 
19 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75 (1906) (“While an individual may lawfully refuse to 
answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a 
corporation . . . may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.”). 
20 See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 587 (1839) (remarking that corporations 
cannot claim “the rights which belong to its members as citizens of a state”). 
21 See Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906) (“The liberty referred to in 
[the Fourteenth Amendment] is the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.”). 
22 See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
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“real entity” that can exercise all or most of the legal rights of an individual 
person; or an aggregate entity that helps groups of people realize their 
interests. The Court noted the difficulty in categorizing firms, which range 
from media companies to small closely held corporations to large public 
companies, and recognized that they exist for a wide range of purposes. In 
Hobby Lobby, the majority called it “quite beside the point” that the plain-
tiffs were for-profit organizations incorporated separately from their 
owners, blithely offering that without the action of human beings, a corpo-
ration “cannot do anything at all.”23  
Legal scholars have long found the Supreme Court’s lack of a coherent 
approach or engagement with theoretical questions concerning the nature of 
the firm deeply disturbing, calling the Court’s rulings “ad hoc,” “right-by-
right,” “arbitrary,” “sporadic,” inconsistent, and incoherent.24 Scholarly 
objections to the Court’s rulings concerning corporate constitutional rights 
have only increased post–Citizens United.25  
 
23 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
24 See, e.g., Tom Bennigson, Nike Revisited: Can Commercial Corporations Engage in Non-
Commercial Speech?, 39 CONN. L. REV. 379, 399 (2006) (describing a “right-by-right” approach); 
Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) (calling the Court’s approach “ad 
hoc” and “arbitrary,” “fundamentally flawed,” and inconsistent even within the same constitutional 
amendments); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 
HASTINGS L.J. 577, 650 (1990) (calling the Court’s practical approach to corporate rights 
“Constitutional Operationalism”); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Corporations 
Revisited: Social and Political Expression and the Corporation After First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 
GEO. L.J. 1347, 1347-48 (1979) (calling the Court’s approach “sporadic” and noting “the artificial 
nature of a corporation is an inherent source of difficulty in developing an all-encompassing 
rationale”); Adam Winkler, The Corporation in Election Law, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1243, 1243 (1999) 
(“[E]lection law has not settled on a single, coherent conception of the corporation—what it is, 
what values it serves, and what role it should play in politics.”); Michael D. Rivard, Comment, 
Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood: A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for 
Transgenic Humanoid Species, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1465 (1992) (finding that the Court’s 
pragmatic approach to corporate rights has left the jurisprudence “fragmentary, conclusory, and 
contradictory”).  
25 See, e.g., Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing 
Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 517 (2012) (arguing that Citizens United 
characterized corporations as disadvantaged persons by upholding corporate freedom of speech 
against government intrusion). It is a separate question—one whose importance I do not want to 
minimize, although it is not the subject of this Article—whether the Citizens United decision 
“undeniably allows monied special interests to influence both elections and the elected representa-
tives who benefit as a result.” Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 
151 (2012); see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 931 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“The Court’s ruling threatens to undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the 
Nation.”); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 
583 (2011) (remarking that Citizens United has left incoherence in the Court’s campaign finance 
jurisprudence); Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Orphaned Antidistortion Rationale, 27 
GA. ST. U. L. REV. 989, 999 (2011) (discussing Justice Steven’s vigorous dissent in Citizens 
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In this Article, I part company with the many cogent critics of the 
Supreme Court’s rulings, but also with those who conversely argue that in 
Citizens United (and perhaps now in Hobby Lobby), the Court has finally 
recognized corporations as “real entit[ies].”26 The Court adopts a consistent 
approach, but the approach proceeds right-by-right, rather than by starting 
with a theory of organizations or corporations as constitutional actors. 
When the Court embarked on the project of incorporating the Bill of 
Rights against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, as I describe 
in Part I of this Article, it ultimately rejected the “total incorporation” 
approach championed by Justice Black in favor of a “selective incorporation” 
approach—considering rights one at a time and asking whether each should 
apply to state actors.27 What do the great incorporation debates tell us about 
the subject of constitutional rights of corporations? Critically, the Court 
refused to alter the substantive content of any Bill of Rights provision when 
extending it to the states; each right must “be enforced . . . according to the 
same standards.”28  
Similarly, as I detail in Part II, the Supreme Court has not extended the 
entire Bill of Rights to corporations. The Court has adopted a selective 
approach from the early Marshall Court rulings to Citizens United. One 
could imagine that each right might apply in different ways to individuals 
and organizations, or apply to only some types of organizations. Instead, the 
Court keeps constant the substantive content of rights when litigated by 
organizations. The Court largely avoids organizational theory and focuses 
on constitutional theory.29 
 
United); Ronald Dworkin, The “Devastating” Decision, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 25, 2010, at 65 
(arguing that Citizens United is incorrect because corporations should not be afforded First 
Amendment protections). But see Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: 
Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 646 (2011) (“Citizens 
United is unlikely to ‘unleash’ corporate campaign spending since corporate spending was not 
really leashed by the law prior to the decision.”). In addressing this question, Ashutosh Bhagwat 
points to the difference between organizational and associational speakers. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, 
Associational Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 978, 1024 (2011) (“The key issue is not the corporate form of the 
speaker but what kind of collective entity—that is to say, association—the speaker is.”). 
26 See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
999, 1043. 
27 See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). 
28 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964) (rejecting “the notion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the individual 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3048 (2010) (“The relationship between the Bill of Rights’ guarantees 
and the States must be governed by a single, neutral principle.”).  
29 For views sympathetic with those described here, treating corporations as convenient 
litigation units, see Burt Neuborne, Of “Singles” Without Baseball: Corporations as Frozen Relational 
Moments, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 769, 771 (2012) (arguing that “the judiciary’s approach to corporate 
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The Supreme Court’s approach should be grounded in the doctrine of 
standing, a body of law flowing from the case-or-controversy requirement of 
Article III, which vests the federal judiciary with the “Power” to decide 
“Cases” and “Controversies.”30 The Court has defined the general test for 
standing as a question whether the organization itself can claim a “concrete 
injury,” or an “injury in fact,” that is separate from any injury to a third 
party.31 The Court has explained that “the injury must affect the plaintiff in 
a personal and individual way.”32 Conceived as a question of standing, rather 
than a question of what an organization is and whether it “has” a constitu-
tional right, the analysis is simple: once an organization has Article III 
standing to litigate a constitutional question, the merits analysis proceeds as 
for an individual litigant.  
In Part III, I develop the implications of Article III standing analysis for 
constitutional corporate rights. Article III standing doctrine has been 
criticized since its inception as a highly malleable set of jurisdictional 
barriers contrary to congressional intent and the structure of the modern 
regulatory state, contrary to the text and history of Article III, and prone to 
particularly controversial and unjustified rulings in cases regarding public 
law and civil rights litigants.33 Without disagreeing with each of those 
 
legal personality” should not “creat[e] a corporate fiction that stands apart from its human 
players”). For an analysis of third-party standing of family-owned corporations, see generally 
Matthew I. Hall & Benjamin Means, Essay, The Prudential Third-Party Standing of Family-Owned 
Corporations, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 151 (2014). 
30 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
31 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (“[A] mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no 
matter how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating 
the problem, is not sufficient by itself to render the organization ‘adversely affected’ or ‘aggrieved’ 
within the meaning of the APA.”); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992) (describing the additional “injury in fact” requirements that the injury is imminent, causally 
connected to the conduct, and “likely” rather than “speculative”); Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) (“[O]rganizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf 
for injuries they have sustained.”).  
32 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.  
33 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1767 (1999) 
(“Any claim that the Constitution, the original intent of the Framers, or Anglo-American legal 
history and tradition compel modern standing law is undermined by the historical studies of 
standing.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1432, 1466, 1480 (1988) (calling the injury-in-fact test “malleable” and the Court’s private-law 
model one that “would also contradict the text and history of article III, fly in the face of 
congressional understandings and expectations, and skew administrative incentives in undesirable 
directions”); Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociology of Article III: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1705-06 (1980) (“Not only do the commentators note such manipulation [of 
standing doctrine], but members of the Supreme Court themselves routinely accuse each other of 
distorting the doctrine for their own purposes.” (footnote omitted)); see also Ann Woolhandler & 
Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 712-13 (2004) 
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criticisms, some of which I have also levied, the modern body of standing 
doctrine provides categories for treatment of organizational litigants. The 
Supreme Court has set out two doctrines of Article III standing—
associational and organizational standing—that, together with the pruden-
tial doctrine of third-party standing, explain when and whether entities can 
litigate constitutional rights. Corporations are separate legal entities that 
have standing to assert rights on behalf of the entity itself. Tracking the 
organizational standing test, a court is most likely to view corporations as 
having Article III standing to assert a constitutional right when that right 
relates to the economic interests. In contrast, associations and religious 
organizations have broad standing to litigate injuries of their members. The 
Court has also set out related prudential standing doctrines that sharply 
limit the ability of third parties to assert rights on behalf of another. Thus 
shareholders can only assert rights derivatively in the name of the corpora-
tion, and conversely, the corporation cannot litigate the separate rights of 
shareholders or other constituents, like officers or employees.34 Those 
Article III tests, I argue, best explain the existing doctrine, even if some of 
the earlier decisions predated the Court’s modern Article III decisions and 
do not frame their reasoning in Article III terms.  
This approach toward corporate constitutional standing is normatively 
preferable, and I sharply criticize the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby 
Lobby for not only ignoring Article III and prudential third-party standing 
entirely but also for using casual language in the opinion that suggests that 
even outside the context of a closely held family-owned corporation, the 
distinctions between associations, religious organizations, and for-profit 
corporations simply do not matter to the analysis. Separating the question 
of Article III standing from the merits importantly avoids advisory opinions 
on constitutional claims, and such caution is particularly warranted when an 
entity seeks to litigate a constitutional right. One person does not normally 
have standing to assert the liberty interest of another. Why a corporation 
can assert the religious beliefs of its owners is a puzzle not clearly answered 
in Hobby Lobby. A careful Article III standing analysis could have more 
narrowly (if not defensibly) explained the result in the case, if limited to the 
 
(responding that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the concern with “private right[s]” 
and the public-private distinction was observed). I have previously critically analyzed the standing 
analysis in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. See Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, 
88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 634 (2012). 
34 I describe those standards in Part III infra. For a concise statement of the basic rule, see, 
for example, Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982), where the Court 
declared that “organizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have 
sustained.” 
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circumstances of a closely held family-owned corporation and if the owners 
did not themselves have standing to sue. That the Court did not engage in 
any such analysis not only adds fuel to the criticism of its free exercise and 
corporate constitutional rights jurisprudence but also to the malleability of 
its Article III jurisprudence. 
As Justice Frankfurter famously remarked, “The history of American 
constitutional law in no small measure is the history of the impact of the 
modern corporation upon the American scene.”35 Corporate litigation has 
long reshaped the content of constitutional rights, from the Lochner era to 
modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Where the corporation is the 
litigant, one may ask different constitutional questions, examine different 
facts, and perhaps reach different answers. Understanding the contours of 
the approach across different areas, from civil procedure to criminal proce-
dure to speech, can help us understand the future direction of corporate 
constitutional litigation. I describe in Part IV how several key rulings by the 
Court, in part due to developments in underlying substantive law, now 
stand on thinner ice.  
Finally, I conclude by exploring how the treatment of corporate consti-
tutional standing helps illuminate something double-edged about constitu-
tional rights more generally: few are framed as purely “individual” rights. 
Constitutional rights are framed generally, often imposing limitations on 
the government or recognizing general privileges or immunities, but not by 
creating individual-specific tests. Moreover, some of the most effective 
constitutional rights may be precisely those not limited by individual 
circumstances, and therefore readily exercised by organizations. At the same 
time, however, such rights may poorly protect individual dignitary interests. 
Individuals have long sought protection by seeking to have associations 
litigate to challenge constitutional violations. However, litigation by 
organizations can also conflict with individual interests and undermine 
individual rights. The Hobby Lobby decision contains dicta suggesting that 
courts need not adhere to well-established categories of Article III standing, 
opening the door to all manner of ill-advised corporate standing. That 
specter provides all the more reason to scrutinize corporate assertions of 
constitutional standing carefully if and when corporations act at the expense 
of individual rights.  
 
35 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY AND 
WAITE 63 (1937). 
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I. SELECTIVE INCORPORATION OF CORPORATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The debates over total and selective incorporation raged through the 
1960s, and they occasionally resurface when the Supreme Court considers 
whether to incorporate—that is, to make applicable against the states—one 
of the lingering constitutional rights not already incorporated through the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause during the heyday of incorpo-
ration. Debates over the proper scope of incorporation returned, for example, 
when the Court incorporated the Second Amendment right to bear arms 
against the states in McDonald v. City of Chicago.36 Those debates focused on 
whether the operation and substance of constitutional provisions should be 
operationalized as against state actors. Although ultimately incorporating 
most of the Bill of Rights against the states, the Court asks whether a 
particular right is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system 
of justice.”37 Without making too much of the comparison, there are useful 
parallels to the more gradual process of recognizing—and sometimes not 
recognizing—corporate constitutional rights.  
Most relevant is the way selective incorporation treats the underlying 
constitutional rights. When deciding to selectively incorporate the Bill of 
Rights as against the States, the Supreme Court refused to alter the substan-
tive content of any Bill of Rights provision when it extended the rights to the 
States; the rights must all “be enforced against the States under the Four-
teenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect those 
personal rights against federal encroachment.”38 I argue that the Court has 
done the same across a wide range of constitutional rights as applied to 
corporations. 
Just as incorporating much of the Bill of Rights as against the states has 
reshaped constitutional litigation, permitting corporations and organizations 
to litigate constitutional rights has had dramatic consequences. That is the 
limit of the comparison. The question is whether organizations may possess 
constitutional protections and, if so, which ones. While the due process 
principle of “ordered liberty” provided a test to decide whether rights apply 
as against the states, that principle would not work to decide if corporations 
have constitutional rights. A different principle is required, and I develop in 
Part II how Article III standing requirements provide that general principle. 
 
36 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010). 
37 Id. at 3034. 
38 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).  
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A. To Whom Do Constitutional Rights Attach? 
Asking whether a corporation itself has standing to litigate a constitu-
tional right in federal court is a question that implicates the underlying legal 
status of the corporation and the interests accompanying it. State law 
defines the status of an incorporated or other form of business entity.39 
State or federal law may provide a natural person with some type of legal 
status like citizenship, domicile, or marriage. State law defines the organiza-
tional requirements for being recognized as a type of corporation or part-
nership, as well as the legal consequences of such status.40 A corporation 
may have a very large group of shareholders and separate management if it 
is a public corporation with stock that is listed, or it may be a very large 
corporation with private owners. A corporation may have a small group of 
members (or not, if it is a sole proprietorship); in fact, the vast majority of 
corporations are quite small.41 Other organizations include partnerships, 
owned by a group, and limited liability corporations (LLCs). LLCs are 
simple to create, like partnerships, but enjoy limited liability like corpora-
tions.42 Since a corporation is a creature of state law, federal courts may be 
leery of interfering with the definition of its legal status under state law.43 
In contrast, federal courts play an important role in defining status relating 
to citizenship and immigration, which are defined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment and federal law. The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees 
citizenship rights, making such questions of federal and constitutional 
concern. For example, the right to vote is “a citizen’s right to vote.”44 Legal 
permanent residents and other gradations of immigration status may bring 
with them intermediate forms of constitutional protection.45 Juveniles do 
 
39 See Michael J. Phillips, Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation, 21 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 1061, 1064 (1994) (defining a corporation as “an artificial legal person created by state 
law”). 
40 See id. (noting that a “corporation derives its being by concession from the State”). 
41 See Statistics About Business Size (Including Small Business) from the U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (2007), http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
5MZ-9AHC (providing data on average business sizes). 
42 See generally Daniel M. Häusermann, For a Few Dollars Less: Explaining State to State Varia-
tion in Limited Liability Company Popularity, 20 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011) (describing the 
mechanics of various business organization forms). 
43 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775 (discussing how courts will “turn to” the “underlying 
state” corporate law when “resolving disputes”). 
44 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964). 
45 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-12 (1982) (holding that noncitizens that illegally 
entered the United States are protected by the Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. 
Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 601 (1953) (“While it may be that a resident alien’s ultimate right to remain 
in the United States is subject to alteration by statute or authorized regulation . . . , it does not 
follow that he is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to procedural due process.”). But see 
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not enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults, although they will with 
age become full rights-bearing citizens.46 Criminal convictions may cause 
citizens to lose the right to vote or serve on juries, and prisoners may have 
altered constitutional rights as well.47 Those questions about altered consti-
tutional rights as connected to citizenship status do not affect domestic 
corporations (though perhaps they could affect foreign corporations) 
because corporations are not citizens, as the Supreme Court has held since 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in Bank of the United States v. 
Deveaux.48 As a result, as Amy J. Sepinwall puts it, “[c]orporations, it goes 
without saying, are neither expected nor entitled to vote, perform jury duty, 
or serve in the military.”49 
That said, in other contexts in which state law defines legal status, the 
Court has set out constitutional limits on the degree to which a state may 
limit access to that status or burden it. For example, the Court has recog-
nized a fundamental right to access to marriage.50 The Court has recognized 
certain rights of parents, including that parents may constitutionally 
challenge state decisions to remove children from their custody, while non-
parents do not enjoy the same constitutional rights to seek custody of a 
child.51 A married couple may enjoy joint rights as well as obligations of the 
marital status. A state adoption judgment may create parental status.52 Nor 
is there anything unusual about shared property interests, or multiple 
 
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (concluding that noncitizens with no 
“substantial connections” to the United States lack Fourth Amendment protection). 
46 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (“[J]uvenile offenders constitutionally 
may be treated differently from adults.”); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 
52, 74 (1976) (recognizing that although everyone is entitled to constitutional rights, states 
generally have more power to regulate activities of children). 
47 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (holding that a prisoner “retains those First 
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system”). 
48 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). 
49 Amy J. Sepinwall, Citizens United and the Ineluctable Question of Corporate Citizenship, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 575, 604 (2012). 
50 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of 
man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”). 
51 See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“The fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply 
because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.”). 
52 See Pamela K. Terry, E Pluribus Unum? The Full Faith and Credit Clause and Meaningful 
Recognition of Out-of-State Adoptions, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 3093, 3113 (2012) (“Although an agency 
or individuals may now ‘arrange’ an adoption, the legal relationship of parent and child cannot be 
created without a judicial decree.” (footnote omitted)). 
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people bringing legal actions asserting shared or competing property 
interests.53 
In Levy v. Louisiana, making the connection between corporate persons 
and cases regarding the status of individuals, Justice Douglas famously 
wrote that illegitimate children are persons, rhetorically asking: “would a 
corporation, which is a ‘person’ . . . be required to forgo recovery for wrongs 
done its interests because its incorporators were all bastards?”54 As with 
other forms of legal status, the corporation includes a defined bundle of 
legal rights and obligations. Although those rights are defined by state law, a 
state may violate the constitutional rights of a corporate “person” by 
unconstitutionally limiting access to those goods. As I will explain, however, 
calling corporations “persons” may not be a helpful usage. I argue that 
corporations litigate constitutional rights because they have standing to 
litigate an injury to the entity and associations have standing to litigate on 
behalf of their members, while organizations generally lack standing to 
litigate on behalf of other constituents such as employees and officers. 
B. Theories of Corporate Personhood 
There is no one single approach to constitutional personhood of corpo-
rations. Nor is there a single theory that enjoys universal acceptance of what 
kind of person or entity a corporation or organization is. Early Supreme 
Court cases, discussed in sections that follow, placed some emphasis on the 
“artificial” nature of firms as fictional legal creations. Chief Justice John 
Marshall, for example, famously called a corporation “an artificial being, 
invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”55 However, 
far from characterizing a corporation as a mere legal fiction, Chief Justice 
Marshall also placed great emphasis on the remarkable ability of corpora-
tions to realize the “charitable or other useful” and “beneficial” goals of their 
creators.56 Relatedly, as at common law, early courts emphasized the “grant” 
or “concession” theory, recognizing that corporations owe their existence to 
the state, and therefore serve at the pleasure of the state.57 Other courts and 
 
53 See, e.g., 26 C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments § 38 (2014) (noting that in a declaratory judgment 
action, “[a]ny person having an interest under a . . . legal instrument, or whose rights, status, or 
other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have 
determined any question of construction or validity . . . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, 
or other legal relations thereunder”). 
54 Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968). 
55 Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819). 
56 Id. at 637-38.  
57 See Phillips, supra note 39, at 1064-65 (noting that a “corporation derives its being by con-
cession from the State”). 
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commentators have long viewed such entities as “aggregate” in nature, since 
they involve groups of people who contract together, and some, like partner-
ships, are governed by a group of owners.58 By the turn of the twentieth 
century, courts and commentators increasingly emphasized that corpora-
tions should be treated as “real” or independent legal persons with some of 
the same rights as natural persons, but separate and distinct from their 
members.59 
The selective incorporation approach adopted by the Court avoided 
questions relating to the nature of states as sovereigns and whether constitu-
tional rights apply differently to the states. Instead, the approach focused on 
whether each right was so important that it deserved protection from 
violation by state actors.60 The approach toward constitutional rights of 
corporations has some parallels. 
Some have argued that the Court should start by defining what a corpo-
ration or organization is and then build a theory of constitutional rights 
from that underlying definition. Does it take a theory of corporate constitu-
tional rights? For example, Carl Mayer has argued that “[a]fter 1960, the 
Court abandoned theorizing about corporate personhood.”61 I am not 
convinced the Court was in that business either before or after 1960. To be 
sure, theorists in corporate law, corporate governance, philosophy, and 
organizational behavior have debated for over a century how best to define a 
corporation. Corporations and other organizations each have a complex 
range of legal duties and rights under the statutes, procedures, and case law 
regulating their creation. It is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to decide 
which are most salient. Different characteristics are salient for different 
purposes. For constitutional purposes, different characteristics may be 
salient depending upon the constitutional right in question. 
 
58 As I will discuss, I view modern corporations and limited liability corporations, though not 
consisting of equal partners, as forms of aggregate or group governance. There are questions 
regarding which individuals are to be considered part of the aggregate entity. For example, one 
may consider whether shareholders, directors, officers, and employees should also be viewed as 
part of the entity. See Phillips, supra note 39, at 1065-67 (describing various aggregate entity 
theories and their inclusion of different players in the corporate structure). 
59 See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives 
from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1507-08 (1989) (exploring the changing views of corporations 
during this period); Phillips, supra note 39, at 1064-70 (setting forth three conceptions of a 
corporation that competed for acceptance from the 1890s to the 1930s). 
60 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010) (noting that selective 
incorporation first requires an examination of whether the “particular Bill of Rights guarantee is 
fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and system of justice”). 
61 Mayer, supra note 24, at 620. 
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The idea that corporations may exercise constitutional rights is nothing 
new. The Supreme Court has struggled with the constitutional status of 
corporations since the Marshall Court. Corporate personhood itself evolved 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a complex and 
powerful legal concept. Yet neither judges nor scholars during this period 
could reconcile whether corporations were simply legal creations, “persons” 
with real rights, aggregations that protected rights of their individual 
members and shareholders, or some combination of those ideas.62 While 
debates about the nature of the firm raged for decades in the early twentieth 
century, those debates eventually cooled. 
One reason may have been the intervention of pragmatists, or legal real-
ists, who were unconcerned with whether there was any true “essence” of 
what a corporation is. Most famously, perhaps, John Dewey, the pragmatist 
philosopher, wrote in 1926 that we should be “eliminating the idea of 
personality until the concrete facts and relations involved have been faced 
and stated on their own account: retaining the word will then do no great 
harm.”63 Accompanying (or even driving) this change in outlook was an 
increasingly national and international economic interconnectedness, along 
with the rise of the modern regulatory state, which together caused corpora-
tions and business organizations to be viewed quite differently. Far more 
typical of the Supreme Court’s “realist” view of the status of corporations 
was language in the famous International Shoe decision regarding personal 
jurisdiction, which notably did not dwell on the formal status of incorpora-
tion, “[s]ince the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction 
intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact.”64 Instead, the Court 
focused its due process analysis on the “activities” and “contacts” of a 
corporation with a state, whether “it enjoys the benefits and protection of 
the laws of that state,” and whether jurisdiction over such business activity 
is “reasonable.”65 Avoiding questions whether a corporation is a “real” or an 
“artificial” legal creation, an aggregate, or some of each, the question the 
 
62 See Bratton, supra note 59, at 1484 (advancing the various theories for how to conceive of 
corporations); Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in 
American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1445 (1987) (noting that “[s]everal conceptions of the 
corporation were available to theorists and policy makers” in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries). 
63 John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 673 (1926). 
64 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
65 Id. at 317-19. For an argument that the status of a corporation as a network of underlying 
contracts, as opposed to a legal entity, supports constitutional rights of corporations, see Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 (1995). 
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Court addressed was how law should regulate the entity and what practical 
effects follow.  
Some critics of the Court’s approach in such rulings, who wish that the 
Court would directly engage more in questions of theory of the firm, do 
concede, as Carl Mayer does, that “[t]he Court is on much safer ground 
looking to the purpose of the first, fourth, or fifth amendments than 
attempting to define the relationship of corporations to the state.”66 A 
“pragmatic methodology” does not, as Mayer argues, obscure an “antecedent, 
and theoretical, question of what is the nature and purpose of a corpora-
tion.”67 Such methodology avoids that question because it is not properly a 
constitutional question, but instead one defined by state law. Now, there 
may be different types of questions in the context of a particular constitu-
tional right whether the Court has sufficiently avoided intervening in 
questions of corporate governance or instead alters the constitutional 
analysis. As Justice Rehnquist explained: 
Extension of the individual freedom of conscience decisions to business 
corporations strains the rationale of those cases beyond the breaking point. 
To ascribe to such artificial entities an ‘intellect’ or ‘mind’ for freedom of 
conscience purposes is to confuse metaphor with reality. . . . The insistence 
on treating identically for constitutional purposes entities that are demon-
strably different is as great a jurisprudential sin as treating differently those 
entities which are the same.68  
Whether or not organizations and business corporations can be conceived as 
possessing individual freedom of conscience or liberty rights, it is a separate 
question whether they can effectively litigate those issues on behalf of 
individuals. 
II. A TAXONOMY OF CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
In this Part, I argue that for each constitutional right the Supreme Court 
has considered, the Court has adopted a consistent approach by largely 
avoiding questions concerning the inherent nature of different types of 
entities. Instead, the Court focuses on the consequences of finding that an 
organization has standing to assert the right by examining the purposes of 
 
66 Mayer, supra note 24, at 646. However, he then argues that the Court “engages in Consti-
tutional Operationalism by suggesting that a corporation is only entitled to the guarantees of a 
certain amendment if, by so awarding the protection, the amendment’s purposes are furthered.” Id. 
at 650. 
67 See id. 
68 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 33, 35 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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the particular constitutional right to decide if entities have asserted a 
sufficient injury creating standing to litigate the right. I will describe how 
the Court and lower courts have grappled with whether, and under what 
circumstances, a wide range of constitutional rights can attach to organizations.  
A. The Contract Clause 
What did the Framers think about corporations? Perhaps not much. The 
word corporation does not appear in the Constitution.69 Justice Scalia has 
argued corporations were familiar as a part of economic life by the time of 
the founding and that much of the disapproval of state-chartered corpora-
tions related to grants of monopolies and special privileges, which would 
not apply to generally chartered modern corporations.70 To be sure, as 
Justice Brandeis put it, “at first, the corporate privilege was granted sparingly; 
and only when the grant seemed necessary in order to procure for the 
community some specific benefit otherwise unattainable.”71 
Early Supreme Court rulings dealt with the Bank of the United States, 
highly controversial in both of its incarnations, and also less controversial 
corporations for the time, including charitable organizations such as univer-
sities. In Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, the Supreme Court called 
corporations “a mere creature of the law, invisible, intangible, and incorpo-
real.”72 Yet the Court treated them as “citizens” for diversity under Article 
III, since “corporations have been included within terms of description 
appropriated to real persons.”73 The Court recognized that there was no 
reason not to give corporations legal standing to litigate in federal court. 
In a far more significant ruling, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in Trustees 
of Dartmouth College v. Woodward how the Contract Clause of the Constitu-
tion protects corporate charters from alteration by state legislation.74 Chief 
 
69 Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
BUS. L.J. 221, 232 (2011).  
70 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct.at 926 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
71 Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
72 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 86 (1809). 
73 Id. at 88. However, the Court did so by asking that courts “look to the character of the 
individuals who compose [it].” Id. at 91-92. Adopting a different approach, the Court in Louisville, 
Cincinnati & Charleston Railroad Co. v. Letson, held that a corporation is “capable of being treated as 
a citizen of [the state which created it], as much as a natural person.” 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 
(1844). The Court has declined to extend similar treatment, however, to a partnership. See, e.g., 
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 192 (1990) (holding that the citizenship of both general 
and limited partners controls the question of diversity); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 
U.S. 449, 454 (1900) (refusing to treat a limited partnership association as a corporation for 
purposes of jurisdiction). 
74 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 630 (1819). 
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Justice Marshall emphasized that corporations were an “artificial being” that 
existed “only in contemplation of law.”75 That language regarding artificiality 
is often taken out of context to suggest that the Court adopted an “artificial 
entity” view that corporations exist only as creatures of law. However, the 
word artificial did not necessarily have a negative connotation at the time: 
human artifice and creativity was something to be admired.76 Indeed, much 
of the language of the opinion went on to say that corporations are designed 
for the “beneficial” purposes of holding and protecting the private property 
of individual people. Chief Justice Marshall celebrated the importance of 
this human creation as a means to accomplish charitable and educational 
goals that could not be attained otherwise.77 Corporations may be created by 
law, but they accomplish important goals of individuals, such as protecting 
property and furthering the public good. The reasoning was consequentialist 
and pragmatic, and it set the tone for the Court’s jurisprudence that 
followed. 
B. The Equal Protection Clause 
Following Reconstruction, the Court held that corporations are not citi-
zens under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.78 In contrast, in 1886, the Court noted that it did not wish to 
hear argument in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. on the 
question whether corporations were protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since the Justices “[we]re all of 
opinion that it does.”79 That statement has been reaffirmed in a series of 
opinions since, such that the Court in 1985 called the principle that corpora-
tions have Equal Protection Clause rights “well established.”80 The view was 
 
75 Id. at 636. 
76 I am grateful to John O’Brien for making this important point. 
77 See Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 638 (describing the various benefits that corporations 
confer upon the public). 
78 See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177 (1869) (“The term citizens [as used in the 
Fourteenth Amendment] applies only to natural persons, . . . not to artificial persons created by 
the legislature . . . .”). The Court had earlier reached the same conclusion as to the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clauses. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586-87 
(1839). 
79 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886). 
80 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 n.9 (1985); S. Ry. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U.S. 400, 412 (1910) (“That a corporation is a person, within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, is no longer open to discussion.”); see also Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: 
The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 177-78 (1985) (explaining the context 
leading up to the Santa Clara decision). But see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 
576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]here was no history, logic, or reason given 
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that corporations exist to protect the property interests of their owners and 
can therefore assert those interests in litigation.81 
C. The Due Process Clause 
The conventional understanding of the due process rights of corpora-
tions is compatible with corporations litigating these rights—at least in 
regard to property rights and not liberty rights. The Court held early on, in 
1906, that corporations may not litigate liberty rights under the Due Process 
Clause because it protects “the liberty of natural, not artificial persons.”82 
Corporations have exercised due process rights regarding property, how-
ever, for over a century. In the 1893 Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co. 
decision, the Court first extended due process protections to a corpora-
tion.83 The Due Process Clause would come into its own in the Lochner era, 
deployed by corporations to challenge regulations.84 Those substantive 
rulings were quite controversial. They permitted corporations to overturn 
regulations with public interest goals, and the Court would ultimately 
reconsider that substantive due process jurisprudence. That a corporation 
had standing to raise attacks on statutes in litigation itself was not contro-
versial; instead, it was the way that the Court interpreted the Due Process 
Clause to protect corporate freedom to contract. Corporate standing to 
challenge regulations should not be controversial. If corporations could not 
do so, then regulations chiefly intended to regulate corporations could be 
drafted in arbitrary ways. Corporations and other business entities are the 
logical entities to have standing to litigate such issues. 
The Due Process Clause also regulates personal jurisdiction. That area 
provides the most difficult questions concerning “where” a corporation is 
and where it is “at home.”85 Corporations are frequent litigants and fre-
quently on the receiving end of litigation. Federal judges have no choice but 
 
[in Santa Clara] to support [the] view”); Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 
(1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (“I do not believe the word ‘person’ in the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes corporations.”).  
81 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 
1593, 1649 (1988) (concluding “the corporate personhood doctrine of Santa Clara represented an 
efficient way for the corporation to assert the property rights of its shareholders”). 
82 Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). 
83 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893).  
84 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278 (1932) (“Plainly, a regulation 
which has the effect of denying or unreasonably curtailing the common right to engage in a lawful 
private business . . . cannot be upheld consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
85 See generally Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 527 (2012) (citing challenges inherent in deciding where a corporation is “essentially 
at home”). 
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to conceptualize a corporation and its litigation expectations when deciding 
whether and when it is appropriate to find personal jurisdiction over a 
corporation. Rather than limit litigation against corporations to the state in 
which they are domiciled or have their principal place of business, federal 
judges focus more broadly on what “minimum contacts” and “purposeful 
availment” a business has with another state, together with other features of 
those contacts, including the reasonableness of the jurisdiction, the benefits 
the corporation receives from business in the state, the burdens and incon-
venience of litigation in the state, and the foreseeability of litigation in the 
state.86 
A corporation may be sued for all purposes, under the due process heading 
of “general jurisdiction,” in limited circumstances, even outside of its state 
of incorporation. General jurisdiction is a concept that does not arise for 
individuals, who can be domiciled in at most one state, but it does for 
artificial entities that may be “present” in multiple states.87 Although this 
corner of the personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has garnered attention in 
recent Supreme Court interventions regarding when a corporation has so 
much continuous contact so as to be “essentially at home” in a state and 
subject to suit for activities unrelated to those in-state,88 courts have rarely 
needed to rule on general jurisdiction over corporations. After all, the 
modern personal jurisdiction test is so broad that specific jurisdiction is 
usually straightforward to obtain. Corporations with broad business dealings 
can use contractual forum selection clauses to minimize inconvenience of 
litigation, while states can make consent to jurisdiction a condition of 
incorporation.89 It was modern commerce that caused the Supreme Court to 
modernize the personal jurisdiction test and adopt the “minimum contacts” 
framework for individuals and corporations alike. 
The Supreme Court has also long allowed corporations to challenge 
criminal statutes. Since a corporation may be prosecuted for the acts of its 
employees, it should be able to assert due process objections to a criminal 
 
86 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316-20 (1945) (discussing each of these 
factors). 
87 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (“A 
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to 
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”). 
88 See, e.g., id. at 2850; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) 
(plurality opinion) (referring to general jurisdiction as perhaps limited to the state of “incorpora-
tion or principal place of business for corporations”). 
89 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (1991) (upholding a forum 
selection clause contained within a ticket-purchase contract). 
  
2014] Constitutional Standing of Corporations 115 
 
statute as a defense to its prosecution.90 Landmark criminal procedure 
rulings by the Court have occurred in cases brought by corporations as 
litigants. The issues in those cases may be little different than if an individual 
had challenged the statute, although corporations may have more resources 
to mount costly appellate litigation. In doing so, corporations may create 
important precedent for individual defendants as well. 
D. The First Amendment 
The constitutional rights of corporate persons have become a subject of 
popular and political debate in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2010 
decision in Citizens United. There, the Court ruled in favor of a nonprofit 
corporation that brought a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BCRA), which had barred corporations and unions from 
making direct contributions or from using independent expenditures for 
“electioneering communication” or speech expressly advocating election or 
defeat of a political candidate.91 As Robert Sprague and Mary Ellen Wells 
put it: “To say that Citizens United’s holding is controversial is an under-
statement.”92 This Section tackles why I think some of the conventional 
understanding of Citizens United is wrong. 
Some argue that Citizens United changed the entire map of corporate 
constitutional rights. They view the case as creating a presumption in favor 
of corporations possessing all constitutional rights, even liberty-oriented 
speech rights.93 I disagree with such characterizations of the ruling. The 
Court’s ruling may very well have a dramatic impact on elections, and it 
may be wrong as a matter of policy, and even as a matter of First Amend-
ment interpretation. What the Court did not do, however, was depart from 
its prior rulings regarding whether organizations have constitutional rights. 
Indeed, neither the majority nor the dissent questioned that corporations 
have First Amendment rights. Where they disagreed was whether a compelling 
state interest justified restricting corporate political donations. 
 
90 See, e.g., Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 83-86 (1908) (considering due 
process defense by a corporation charged for violating the Elkins Act).  
91 130 S. Ct. at 911 (interpreting 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2012)). Media corporations were 
exempted from the BCRA’s coverage. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (2012). The Court emphasized 
that “[t]here is no precedent supporting laws that attempt to distinguish between corporations 
which are deemed to be exempt as media corporations and those which are not.” Citizens United, 
130 S. Ct. at 905. 
92 Sprague & Wells, supra note 25, at 508. 
93 See, e.g., Joanna M. Meyer, Note, The Real Error in Citizens United, 69 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 2171, 2187-88 (2012) (suggesting that Citizens United is problematic because it does not 
conduct a careful analysis about why a corporation is entitled to First Amendment protection). 
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The Court’s broader First Amendment jurisprudence helps to explain 
why it was not controversial to conclude that corporations have First 
Amendment rights, which the Court first recognized in its 1978 First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti decision.94 While critics find it objectionable 
that corporations benefit from a right as “personal” as the First Amendment 
free speech right, the First Amendment protects “speech” and not persons.95 
In addition, the First Amendment mentions the “press,” which some 
scholars have argued indicates an understanding of the crucial role that 
media organizations play in promoting speech.96 In First Amendment cases, 
the Court is focused on the marketplace of ideas,97 which then leads to a 
broad notion of corporate standing to litigate participation in that market-
place. 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the underlying speech protection to 
protect speech and not speakers. In Bellotti, the Court noted speech does not 
lose First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a corpora-
tion.”98 The Court rejected arguments that special dangers of corporate 
participation in the political process, or the rights of shareholders that 
might disapprove of the corporate speech, were implicated by the particular 
statute, and so could not suffice as a compelling state interest to justify 
restricting corporate speech.99 
Following that ruling, the Court attempted to fashion a taxonomy of 
types of organizations, and in a series of rulings, developed a complex 
approach in which regulations could bar some corporate political donations 
but not others, depending on the type of corporation or organization. This 
approach began in 1982 in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee where 
the Court found that a federal campaign statute restricting which persons 
could be solicited to contribute to segregated corporate funds “reflect[ed] a 
legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the corporate structure 
 
94 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). The Court did not reach the issue in earlier cases. See, e.g., Pipe-
fitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1972) (“This disposition 
makes decision of the constitutional issues premature, and we therefore do not decide them.”); 
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957) (noting the Court’s “[r]efusal to anticipate 
constitutional questions”). 
95 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
96 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 848 (2008) 
(discussing the “institutionally aware” First Amendment); Frederick Schauer, Towards an 
Institutional First Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1274 (2005) (“I want to suggest that a certain 
number of existing social institutions in general, even if not in every particular, serve functions 
that the First Amendment deems especially important . . . .”). 
97 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (framing the protec-
tions of the First Amendment as covering anyone who wishes to enter the “marketplace of ideas”). 
98 435 U.S. at 784. 
99 Id. at 789-92. 
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require particularly careful regulation.”100 In FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for 
Life, Inc., the Court ruled that a federal statute requiring corporations to 
make independent political expenditures only through special segregated 
funds, 2 U.S.C. § 441b, unduly burdened corporate freedom of expression as 
applied to a small nonprofit corporation, which would not be able to afford 
to comply, in part because it was not a business corporation and did not 
accept contributions from business corporations.101 However, the Court 
emphasized in contrast that business corporations can use “resources 
amassed in the economic marketplace” to obtain “an unfair advantage in the 
political marketplace.”102 Further, the Court emphasized corporate resources 
“are not an indication of popular support for the corporation’s political 
ideas; they reflect instead the economically motivated decisions of investors 
and customers.”103 Similarly, in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee, the Court recognized a compelling government interest in 
“preventing corruption,” but in that case struck down a statute as over-
broad.104 
The taxonomy approach, permitting legislation to distinguish types of 
organizations and corporations, appeared ascendant. Its apogee was the 
Court’s 1990 ruling, Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which followed 
those prior decisions to hold that political donations could be limited if the 
speaker was an entity, but only depending on the type of company at 
issue.105 The Austin Court adopted a fine-grained view of how corporations 
might be affected by speech-restricting regulations. Although the Michigan 
law distinguished between business corporations and unions, the Court 
noted that the distinction was appropriate given that federal law limits 
political spending by unions to segregated funds raised through voluntary 
contributions.106 Similarly, the Court explained that the Michigan statute 
could sensibly exclude media corporations, given the “unique role” the press 
 
100 459 U.S. 197, 209-10 (1982). 
101 479 U.S. 238, 264 (1986). 
102 Id. at 257. 
103 Id. at 258. For additional discussion of stockholder’s rights, see Victor Brudney, Business 
Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights Under the First Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 235, 247 (1981). 
104 470 U.S. 480, 500-01 (1985). 
105 494 U.S. 652, 661-62 (1990). 
106 See id. at 665-66 (“An employee who objects to a union’s political activities thus can 
decline to contribute to those activities, while continuing to enjoy the benefits derived from the 
union’s performance of its duties as the exclusive representative of the bargaining unit on labor-
management issues.”). For a criticism of Austin, see Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 
WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 109, 156 (1992), where the author argues that modern economic theory 
undercuts arguments in favor of regulating corporate speech. 
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plays in informing the public.107 In contrast, business organizations could be 
regulated, based on “the compelling state interest of eliminating from the 
political process the corrosive effect of political ‘war chests’ amassed with 
the aid of the legal advantages given to corporations.”108 The Austin Court 
also emphasized that the Michigan statute that limited independent 
expenditures supporting candidates affected corporations—but corporations 
were themselves a creature of state statutes and derived special advantages 
from them.109 (In dissent, Justice Scalia protested that it would be an 
unconstitutional condition to limit speech based on granting privileges to 
corporations.110) 
The very provisions challenged in Citizens United had been upheld in the 
2003 McConnell v. FEC decision, which noted how the Court had repeatedly 
upheld such restrictions on corporate spending.111 Citizens United marked a 
sharp break from those earlier decisions. The Court emphasized that despite 
not being “natural persons,” corporations have First Amendment rights.112 
That part of the ruling should not be controversial. Corporations have long 
been held to have various constitutional rights—as well as First Amend-
ment rights.  
The change was that the Court rejected the taxonomy-based approach 
distinguishing among organizations. The Court abandoned the nuanced 
approach involving the application of narrow tailoring and compelling state 
interest law that had developed over the prior decades. Under Austin, the 
Court might have narrowly ruled that as a nonprofit organization, Citizens 
United was the type of entity to which people donate money to promote 
their speech, and therefore it should be given an exception from the relevant 
provisions.113 It did not matter what kind of corporation Citizens United 
was—the Court rejected its earlier “intricate case-by-case determinations” 
entirely, electing instead to use a categorical approach finding all such 
 
107 Austin, 494 U.S. at 667. 
108 Id. at 666. 
109 See id. at 658-59 (highlighting some of the advantages conferred upon corporations by the 
states). 
110 See id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the 
price of those special advantages the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”). 
111 540 U.S. 93, 205, 209 (2003) (stating that the Court has “repeatedly sustained legislation” 
that limits corporations’ ability to participate in political advocacy). 
112 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 900 (“The Court has thus rejected the argument that political 
speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First 
Amendment simply because such associations are not ‘natural persons.’”). 
113 Id. at 938 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Court nonethe-
less turns its back on the as-applied review process that has been a staple of campaign finance 
litigation since [1976] . . . .”). 
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restrictions facially invalid.114 The Court also rejected the “antidistortion” 
rationale of Austin, suggesting that it is irrelevant that money from the 
marketplace may not come from the speaker and reasoning that all speakers 
make use of money from the marketplace.115 Finally, the Court rejected the 
exemption of media corporations, reasoning they are no different, and can 
even be controlled by business corporations.116 
Two years after Citizens United, in American Tradition Partnership, Inc. v. 
Bullock, the Court struck down a Montana state law regulating corporate 
political expenditures in a brief, less-than-one-page per curiam opinion117—
there was little to say once Citizens United had adopted a categorical 
approach to restrictions on corporate spending. 
The Court’s decision to treat corporations as no different from any other 
speaker has attracted attention to the case (though Justice Stevens’s dissent 
chiefly focused on stare decisis). Justice Sotomayor anticipated such criti-
cism at oral argument, stating that it would seem as if “the Court imbued a 
creature of State law,” the corporation, “with human characteristics.”118 
Judges and scholars have long debated what a corporation is—whether it is 
an artificial legal entity, an aggregate of individual people, or a real entity. 
For example, Justice White dissented in First National Bank of Boston v. 
Bellotti, arguing “when a profitmaking corporation contributes to a political 
candidate this does not further the self-expression or self-fulfillment of its 
shareholders in the way that expenditures from them as individuals 
would.”119 Justice Stevens’s Citizens United dissent instead emphasized that 
“[t]he financial resources, legal structure, and instrumental orientation of 
corporations raise legitimate concerns about their role in the electoral 
process.”120 He asked “‘who’ is even speaking when a business corporation 
places an advertisement that endorses or attacks a particular candidate.”121 
 
114 Id. at 892 (majority opinion). The majority opinion treated Austin as a break from prior 
precedent, distinguishing the 1980s rulings as either upholding challenged regulations, or dealing 
with soliciting contributions and not limiting the speech itself. Id. at 909, 912. Those efforts to 
distinguish the Court’s pre-Austin rulings ignore how each of the prior decisions adopted a case-
specific compelling interest test—it was not correct to attribute that test to Austin; more accurately, 
in Citizens United, the Court simply rejected that prior test. The dissent in Citizens United argued 
that “the majority blazes through our precedents” and marked a “dramatic break” from prior 
holdings. Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
115 Id. at 905 (majority opinion). 
116 Id. at 905-07. 
117 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam). 
118 Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876 (No. 08-205).  
119 435 U.S. 765, 806 (1978) (White, J., dissenting).  
120 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 930 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
121 Id. at 972. 
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 Some scholars argue that the Citizens United Court endorsed a real or 
natural entity view that a corporation is like an individual human person in 
the way that it can exercise First Amendment rights. Most prominently, 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah argued that Citizens United meant the “real entity view 
prevail[ed].”122 I view Citizens United very differently. The Court took great 
pains not to say what a corporation is or is not. The Court was meticulous 
in abandoning a taxonomy-type approach permitting different types of 
organizations to be treated differently. As in other areas of constitutional 
law, the result sought a single answer, all or nothing, as to whether corpora-
tions and other entities can litigate the constitutional right in question. 
Interestingly, in a brief statement in his concurring opinion, Chief Justice 
Roberts treated the question as one of standing, as part of a discussion 
whether the case raised a question of an as-applied or facial challenge to the 
statute. Chief Justice Roberts said: “Citizens United has standing—it is 
being injured by the Government’s enforcement of the Act.”123 
Put that way, the question of Article III standing to litigate a constitu-
tional right seems an easy one. One can imagine some organizations that 
should be able to make political statements free from restriction; the 
Supreme Court had said for decades that many entire categories of organi-
zations should be immune from regulation of their political speech. As 
noted, under the Court’s precedents, the First Amendment protects such 
speech as part of an effort to promote an entire marketplace of speech. As I 
have already argued, the approach that preserves one single constitutional 
test as applicable to all or no organizations may do a better job of preserving 
consistency in the application of the constitutional right. The Court was 
clearly frustrated that a complex hodgepodge of regulatory and First 
Amendment treatment depended on the type of organization, such as 
whether it was a media organization, a union, or a nonprofit. Standing for 
the corporation would only be problematic if the organization’s interest 
might be in conflict with those of its constituents. The Court addressed the 
question whether shareholders might object to corporate speech by noting 
 
122 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 26, at 1032 (“Why does the real entity view prevail? This is no 
doubt due in part to the fact that it represents the most congenial view to corporate management, 
because it shields management from undue interference from both shareholders and the state.”). 
Avi-Yonah concluded that “[c]orporate management wields political power and it influences the 
outcome of the debate; judges again and again refer to the importance of corporations, by which 
they mean corporate management.” Id. at 1032. But “there is another reason why the real entity 
view prevails: it fits reality much more than the other [theories]. . . . The real entity view 
prevailed because it was more real than the others.” Id. at 1032-33. 
123 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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that “[s]hareholder objections” can be “raised through the procedures of 
corporate democracy.”124  
Of course, the Court in Citizens United did not need to say much to 
explain a decision that organizations can assert First Amendment rights 
because the principle had been well established in decisions reaching back 
decades. The Court briefly noted that it “has recognized that First Amend-
ment protection extends to corporations,” followed with a lengthy citation 
to decisions reaching back to the 1930s.125 Having concluded that corpora-
tions have First Amendment rights, the question that provoked disagree-
ment was whether the government had a substantial interest in regulating 
corporate expenditures in the way that it did. That analysis was also conse-
quentialist, as the Court engaged with the government’s claim that permitting 
such corporate independent expenditures could cause corruption in the 
political process.126 However, the question whether it is good litigation 
policy to permit a corporation to assert a constitutional right is a very 
different question, and conversely, broader social policy will influence how 
one interprets the underlying substance of the constitutional right. 
Deciding that all organizations can litigate their First Amendment 
speech right still does not answer the second and perhaps more important 
question whether certain types of entities might not be able to overcome a 
compelling government interest in regulating their speech. That is a 
question of substantive First Amendment law over which judges and 
scholars can and should disagree. 
A broader question, however, is whether Citizens United and other recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court shed light on which constitutional rights 
corporations may assert and which they may not. What Citizens United does 
suggest is that the Court will analyze the issue by asking the general 
question whether organizations can benefit from the constitutional right. 
The analysis implies that a corporation or organization can effectively assert 
the interests of its members or constituents. The Court assumes that the 
organization has standing as long as it might be an effective constitutional 
litigator, without asking what type of organization it is or what role the 
rights of stakeholders inside and outside the firm have. The question is 
whether all organizations have standing or not. However, as discussed next, 
in contexts seen as more closely connected to government regulation of 
 
124 Id. at 916 (majority opinion). 
125 Id. at 899-900 (citing, for example, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 
(1936), in which the Court noted that a corporation is a “person” under the Due Process Clause, 
which incorporated the First Amendment right in question as against the states). 
126 See id. at 908-11. 
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corporations, the Court may view the policy question whether to permit 
organizational standing to litigate constitutional rights differently. 
E. The Fourth Amendment 
In the Fourth Amendment context, criminal procedure scholars have 
typically observed that corporations have fewer privacy rights as compared 
with individuals. For example, Professor Christopher Slobogin puts it this 
way: “corporations have virtually no Fourth Amendment rights where it 
really counts.”127 I argue that in fact, corporations and individuals are 
treated much the same for Fourth Amendment purposes; decisions that 
appear to limit Fourth Amendment rights of corporations relate to doctrine 
concerning business records and business locations that operate the same 
way for both individuals and corporations.  
Although we may think of the Fourth Amendment as involving a quin-
tessentially individual right, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth 
Amendment to protect collective interests, and has balanced those interests 
against government interests.128 The Court emphasized in Atwater v. City of 
Lago Vista that “sensitive, case-by-case determinations” may not be required, 
where instead a “reasonable Fourth Amendment balance” should involve 
“sufficiently clear and simple” standards and “readily administrable rules.”129 
As Thomas Clancy has argued, the “‘right of the people to be secure’ is a 
collective right, not an individual one.”130 As a result, the Fourth Amend-
ment cases come out in a similar place as the Court’s opinion in Citizens 
United, treating the right as collective and its assertion by organizations as 
straightforward. 
Long lines of precedent have grappled with Fourth Amendment rights 
of corporations and what expectations of privacy exist in places of business, 
both as to the first Fourth Amendment clause concerning freedom from 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” and the second clause prohibiting 
issuance of warrants except “upon probable cause.”131 Some of the Court’s 
statements suggest a special concern that corporations cannot resist requests 
by regulators and prosecutors for documents; the regulatory state requires 
 
127 Christopher Slobogin, Citizens United and Corporate and Human Crime, 41 STETSON L. 
REV. 127, 133 (2011). 
128 See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 
255, 263 (2010) (arguing that, despite the “depth of precedent for the view that the Fourth 
Amendment protects individual rights,” the Court has “increasingly . . . support[ed] a collective 
security model”). 
129 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001). 
130 Clancy, supra note 128, at 296. 
131 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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compliance with subpoenas for regulation to be effective. Indeed, perhaps 
no area of constitutional law has affected the modern regulation of corpora-
tions more than the Court’s Fourth Amendment rulings. Those rulings have 
not received the attention they deserve, perhaps because the practice that 
administrative agencies have broad power to investigate organizations and 
request documents is so longstanding. 
However, early on, the Supreme Court took a very different approach. 
In its 1886 decision in Boyd v. United States, the Court held that a person did 
not need to respond to a subpoena for customs invoices, since it sought “a 
man’s private papers.”132 Yet those were not particularly “personal” or 
private papers; they were business invoices that were needed to show 
whether a company was illegally importing goods into the country.133 That 
was a case involving an individual person, not a corporate defendant. But 
that interpretation of Fourth Amendment law made any kind of an investi-
gation into business conduct very difficult. With the rise of more modern 
federal agencies designed to regulate commerce, the Court, without exten-
sive discussion, abandoned that notion by 1906 in Hale v. Henkel, ruling that 
a corporation has Fourth Amendment rights, and must comply with reasonable 
subpoena requests.134  
The Supreme Court in a series of rulings subsequently made clear that 
extremely broad subpoenas did not violate the Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness requirements. Some of the Court’s language might be taken to 
suggest that corporations were being treated differently. In 1911, the Court 
ruled in Wilson v. United States that a broad request that the company 
president turn over all letters and documents he signed during a certain 
period of time did not violate either the Fourth or Fifth Amendments.135 As 
the Court put it in 1946 in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, “corpo-
rations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private 
individuals have in these and related matters.”136 The Court noted that 
historically corporations had been subject to “visitorial power” and, in a rare 
instance of reasoning across corporate constitutional rights, the Court noted 
that entities lack the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
(as discussed in the next Section).137 Only in extreme cases of overreaching 
and overbroad searches did the Court approve Fourth Amendment 
 
132 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).  
133 See id. at 636. 
134 See 201 U.S. 43, 73 (1906). 
135 221 U.S. 361, 375-76 (1911). 
136 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946). 
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challenges by corporations to subpoenas seeking documents.138 In Walling, 
the Court explained that “the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards 
against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or breadth in the 
things required to be ‘particularly described,’ if also the inquiry is one the 
demanding agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified 
are relevant.”139 
In perhaps the best known of this line of Fourth Amendment cases in-
volving subpoenas for corporate records, United States v. Morton Salt Co., the 
Court treated as unsettled whether corporations had Fourth Amendment 
rights, stating “[i]t is unnecessary here to examine the question of whether a 
corporation is entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”140 But 
the Court went on to emphasize that “corporations can claim no equality 
with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to privacy.”141 Further, the 
Court was tolerant of a quite broad federal search by the Federal Trade 
Commission; even if it was “caused by nothing more than official curiosity,” 
the FTC could satisfy itself that the company was “consistent with law and 
the public interest.”142 
What may have been animating those decisions was a generally deferen-
tial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s role in regulating administra-
tive subpoenas, replacing the Boyd rule with a new rule that applied to both 
individuals and corporations. The new and more forgiving rule was grounded 
in an approach supporting the interests of regulators in supervising busi-
nesses by examining business records. For regulators, information is “the 
fuel without which the administrative engine could not operate.”143 And 
similarly in criminal prosecutions, as Professor William Stuntz put it, “[i]n 
antitrust or mail fraud or tax evasion cases, the damning documents may be 
everything—there is no equivalent to crime scene evidence, and witnesses 
 
138 See, e.g., Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 156 (1923) (stating that unreasonable 
searches “against which the corporation was protected by the Fourth Amendment” work to 
“vitiate[] all the subsequent proceedings to compel production”); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. 
United States, 251 U.S. 385, 390-92 (1920) (rejecting government’s desire to keep documents 
obtained during blatantly unreasonable search). But see Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 142-
43 (1928) (finding that a broad subpoena asking for a large range of documents covering a large 
time period was not overly broad); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 
(1924) (suggesting that Congress might be able to permit a “fishing expedition” into the private 
papers of a company to search for evidence of a crime). 
139 327 U.S. at 208. 
140 338 U.S. 632, 651 (1950). 
141 Id. at 652. 
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are typically involved in the crime.”144 However much animated by concerns 
of effective regulation of business, it is not a different rule regarding Fourth 
Amendment rights of corporations—the Court decided as early as Hale that 
corporations do have Fourth Amendment rights—but limited rights to 
challenge the “reasonableness” of subpoenas. 
Moreover, it is nothing foreign to Fourth Amendment law to consider, 
by way of interpreting “reasonableness,” regulatory or law enforcement 
interests. The Court has created Fourth Amendment rules to balance 
privacy interests against the interest of law enforcement in solving crimes: 
there is the exclusionary rule that prohibits the use at trial of illegally seized 
evidence. However, the rule incorporates all sorts of detailed exceptions, 
including rules that allow police to search evidence in “plain view,” or due to 
“exigency,” or to search someone as part of an arrest, or if the suspect 
provides consent. It should be no surprise that Fourth Amendment rules for 
searches of businesses and regulated industries would include similar types 
of balancing. Nor should it be surprising that based on standard Fourth 
Amendment doctrine, individuals’ homes receive more protection, while 
business premises would not be treated the same way.145 Corporations may 
have standing to litigate Fourth Amendment rights, but the underlying 
right may not benefit corporations to the same degree. 
Nevertheless, the same rules formally apply to corporations and individuals 
when the government wants to do a physical search. Does the government 
need to get a warrant before it searches a business? The answer is yes—
usually. While the typical rule is that searches conducted without a warrant 
“are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,”146 the Court has 
crafted exceptions. One large exception is for suspicionless checkpoints or 
police roadblocks. The Court has approved warrantless check point stops 
near borders to search vehicles for illegal aliens, as well as checkpoints for 
checking drivers’ licenses, checking for sobriety, conducting agricultural 
inspections, checking for fleeing fugitives, or checking for “safety require-
ments, weight limits, and similar matters.”147 A second exception is for 
routine inventory searches of impounded vehicles.148 
 
144 William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 859-60 (2001). 
145 See Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amend-
ment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 921-22 (2010) (arguing that robust Fourth Amendment protection 
of the private residence served to decrease protection of other spaces, such as businesses). 
146 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
147 See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n.14 (1976) (finding border 
checkpoints constitutional); see also Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (finding highway 
checkpoints to ask for information about a recently committed crime constitutional); City of 
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Another narrow exception, however, is for warrantless searches of certain 
pervasively regulated industries. The Court held in Camara v. Municipal 
Court in 1967 that the Fourth Amendment protects individuals against 
unreasonable searches and seizures and warrantless searches in both civil 
and criminal investigations.149 That same year, in See v. City of Seattle, the 
Court held that the Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless 
inspections of commercial premises.150 In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the 
Court examined a provision in the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970 (OSHA Act) that allowed agents of the Secretary of Labor to conduct 
warrantless searches of covered employment facilities.151 The president of 
Barlow’s, Inc. refused to allow the inspectors to enter the premises, citing 
his Fourth Amendment rights.152 The Court emphasized that “the Fourth 
Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ 
experience with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to 
customs officials and other agents of the King to search at large for smug-
gled goods.”153 The “particular offensiveness” of the general warrant and 
writ of assistance “was acutely felt by the merchants and businessmen whose 
premises and products were inspected” under their authority.154 The Court 
concluded that “it is untenable that the ban on warrantless searches was not 
intended to shield places of business as well as of residence.”155  
The Court has only created very limited exceptions from the search 
warrant requirement for “pervasively regulated business”156 and for “closely 
regulated” industries that have been “long subject to close supervision and 
inspection.”157 In Biswell, the Court sustained warrantless searches of 
firearms dealers under the Gun Control Act of 1968, reasoning that the 
regulatory inspections “further[ed] urgent federal interest.”158 The Court 
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noted in Barlow’s that in those industries, “when an entrepreneur embarks 
upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full 
arsenal of governmental regulation,” but seemed to cabin the exception to 
state-licensed industries like firearms and liquor stores.159 Similarly, the 
Court held in Donovan v. Dewey in 1981 that federal mine inspectors may 
conduct warrantless inspections.160 The Court noted that “it is the perva-
siveness and regularity of the federal regulation that ultimately determines 
whether a warrant is necessary to render an inspection program reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”161  
Thus, the pervasively regulated industry exception is quite narrow, and 
largely limited to a few industries that have long been subject to regulation. 
Most recently, in New York v. Burger in 1987, the Court held that an auto-
mobile junkyard could be subject to warrantless regulatory searches but 
reaffirmed that such warrantless searches are only acceptable for a select few 
narrow, pervasively regulated industries.162 Outside the exception, regulators 
must use a warrant (unless, which is often the case, statutes or regulations 
require the company to maintain records and examine transactions, without 
necessarily disclosing them).163 The exception is not different in kind from 
the situations (including border checkpoints and impounded vehicles) in 
which individuals may be subject to warrantless searches. The exception is 
limited and related to certain regulated and carefully defined areas. 
One of the most interesting Fourth Amendment cases was brought to 
challenge a search and seizure of a company. The Dow Chemical Company 
opposed the EPA’s use of aerial surveillance to inspect a massive 2000-acre 
chemical manufacturing complex in Michigan for compliance with envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.164 The Court found that manufacturing 
sites do not enjoy the same privacy protections as the area around a home—and 
 
159 436 U.S. at 313. 
160 452 U.S. 594, 605 (1981). 
161 Id. at 606. 
162 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). 
163 In California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, bankers challenged the Bank Secrecy Act, which 
regulates banks and requires adequate records to be kept on certain types of financial transac-
tions—including those that might be important in criminal, tax, and regulatory investigations and 
proceedings. 416 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1974). For example, automatic reports are to be generated when 
large amounts of currency are deposited or withdrawn, out of a concern that such transactions may 
involve money laundering or other forms of criminality. Id. at 26-27. Among the many constitu-
tional challenges, the Court found the reporting provisions reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment. Id. at 67. The Court also found the provisions to be reasonable and constitutional under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, noting that these were “artificial entities.” Id. at 49, 
66. The Court also held that it did not violate the rights of third-party customers for banks to be 
required to maintain these records. Id. at 52-53. 
164 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 229-30 (1986). 
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that, in particular, private homes have the most heightened privacy protec-
tions.165 The Court did note that “[a]ny actual physical entry by EPA into 
any enclosed area would raise significantly different questions, because 
‘[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional 
right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon 
his private commercial property.’”166 The decision appeared to give less 
Fourth Amendment protection to a business because, after all, a person’s 
home is a far more private place. However, the Court suggested that the 
interior portions of the factory would have protection.167 Moreover, just a 
few years later, the Court held that it was not unreasonable when police 
flew a helicopter over a person’s backyard without a warrant to determine 
whether he was growing marijuana.168  
Once again, maybe people and corporations are not treated so differently 
for Fourth Amendment purposes. Corporations have standing to litigate 
Fourth Amendment rights to challenge searches of corporate premises, 
something which individuals, such as employees and officers, would lack 
standing to do if they were not the target of the search. Once the corpora-
tion asserts a challenge, it does not appear to benefit from special Fourth 
Amendment rules, and, if anything, the justifications for substantive Fourth 
Amendment doctrine have led the Court to craft interpretations of the 
Fourth Amendment that are adapted for investigations of business miscon-
duct and white collar crime. The criminal procedure rules would not likely 
look any different if corporations lacked Fourth Amendment rights and only 
employees could individually assert Fourth Amendment rights at their 
workplaces.  
F. The Fifth Amendment 
The Citizens United Court noted that the relevant election laws con-
tained criminal prohibitions.169 Does Citizens United mean “the final blow 
against those who resist criminal liability for corporations,” as Professor 
Christopher Slobogin puts it?170 Perhaps not, precisely because prosecutions 
of corporations have long been thought important. Corporations may not 
 
165 See id. at 237-38. 
166 Id. at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)). 
167 See id. at 239 (“An electronic device to penetrate walls or windows . . . would raise very 
different and far more serious questions . . . .”). 
168 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
169 130 S. Ct. at 888-89. The criminal provisions were not directly at issue there because 
Citizens United had affirmatively sought to enjoin application of the statute. 
170 Slobogin, supra note 127, at 129.  
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take the Fifth. The Court held in Hale v. Henkel that a corporation’s agent 
may not assert a corporation’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in response to a government subpoena.171 The Court 
explained that “the corporation is a creature of the State” and in addition, 
“[w]hile an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions 
unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corpora-
tion, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its 
hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges.”172 The ruling focused 
on the inability of individuals to assert the corporation’s Fifth Amendment 
rights to justify not testifying, explaining that the right not to testify is 
purely personal.173 Yet the Court also noted that “[i]n organizing itself as a 
collective body [the corporation] waives no constitutional immunities 
appropriate to such body.”174 
The reasoning of the Supreme Court was not that corporations inher-
ently lack criminal procedure rights, given that the Court in that same 
opinion importantly recognized a Fourth Amendment right of corporations 
to resist overbroad subpoenas. Instead, the Court’s rationale was that 
corporations should not be permitted to entirely shield individual conduct 
from regulators and that individual employees should not be able to deriva-
tively assert the corporation’s rights to themselves refuse to comply with 
official requests. The Court’s reasoning was consequentialist.175  
In adopting this consequentialist approach when denying organizational 
standing to assert a right, the Supreme Court has subsequently refused to 
distinguish among most (but not all) types of corporations, rejecting the 
Austin-type fine-grained taxonomy approach. The Court’s Fifth Amendment 
doctrine in this area has been termed the “collective entity rule,” since the 
rule applies not just to corporations. In addition, an individual may not 
assert the Fifth Amendment rights of any organization defined functionally 
as one that “has a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership 
and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely 
private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their 
common or group interests only.”176 The Court subsequently made clear 
 
171 201 U.S. 43, 69-70 (1906). 
172 Id. at 74-75.  
173 Id. at 69. 
174 Id. at 76. 
175 For a brief defense of this reasoning as additionally consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
rationale for criminal liability of corporations generally, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO 
JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 217 (2014).  
176 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944); see also Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 
85, 100 (1974) (quoting White, 322 U.S. at 701). 
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that, since the records are corporate in nature, corporate officers could not 
resist process.177 The blanket rule that organizations have no Fifth Amend-
ment rights has led to some complications, including whether one-person 
corporations also lack Fifth Amendment rights. The Court has ruled that 
sole proprietorships are not collective entities and do have Fifth Amend-
ment rights.178  
The Supreme Court has also highlighted that organizations simply do 
not have the personal privacy interests that individual people have. The 
Fifth Amendment “respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling 
and thought” and seeks to protect it from state compulsion.179 That reasoning 
adds something else to the consequentalist justification that corporate Fifth 
Amendment rights would impair government investigations. It suggests that 
the self-incrimination right simply cannot be delegated from the individual 
to the corporation. One person cannot refuse to speak to police under the 
Fifth Amendment by asserting the potential to incriminate another person. 
That said, even if a corporation had Fifth Amendment rights, an individual 
officer could not claim the self-incrimination right of a corporation, and as I 
will discuss, the practical consequences might not be nearly so great as the 
Court supposed in Hale.  
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that line of reasoning in 2010 in a Freedom 
of Information Act case, FCC v. AT&T Inc., where AT&T objected to the 
FCC disclosing, pursuant to a trade association’s FOIA request, documents 
it had provided to the FCC.180 AT&T argued that it had “personal privacy” 
as a corporation, and that it should be protected by a FOIA exception, 
which says that, based on Fourth Amendment principles, law enforcement 
records should not be disclosed if they “could reasonably be expected to 
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”181 The Court, in an 
 
177 Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 151, 158 (1923) (holding that a corporate officer, “as 
agent of the corporation,” is not protected against a request to produce corporate documents); 
Dreier v. United States, 221 U.S. 394, 400 (1911) (“[Because the corporate records] were the 
documents of the corporation in his custody, and not his private papers, [the defendant] was under 
obligation to produce them when called for by proper process.”); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 
361, 383-84 (1911) (reasoning that a corporation, because it is a creature of the state, must be 
amenable to inquiry by the state into its operations and accounts); In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 279 
(1911) (requiring bankrupt to forfeit books even if they contained evidence of criminal activity). 
178 See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606, 611-12 (1984); Shauna J. Sullivan, Comment, 
Fifth Amendment Protection and the Production of Corporate Documents, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 747, 754 
(1987) (reviewing cases wherein courts held that an individual involved in a sole proprietorship 
was protected from self-incrimination). 
179 Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 91 (1974) (quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 
322, 327 (1973)). 
180 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1180-81 (2011). 
181 Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (2012). 
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opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by all of the justices but 
Justice Kagan who was recused, rejected that argument and said that 
“personal” (as opposed to “person”) normally refers to individuals, and not 
corporations.182 Thus, “[w]e do not usually speak of personal characteristics, 
personal effects, personal correspondence, personal influence, or personal 
tragedy as referring to corporations or other artificial entities.”183 Quite the 
contrary, “we often use the word ‘personal’ to mean precisely the opposite of 
business-related: [w]e speak of personal expenses and business expenses, 
personal life and work life, personal opinion and a company’s view.”184 In a 
charming final note, Chief Justice Roberts concluded: “The protection in 
FOIA against disclosure of law enforcement information on the ground that 
it would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy does not 
extend to corporations. We trust that AT&T will not take it personally.”185 
A separate concern cited in the Fifth Amendment context relates to 
criminal investigations, which requires the balancing of privacy interests 
against the effectiveness of law enforcement. As the Supreme Court put it 
in United States v. White in 1944, “[w]ere the cloak of the privilege to be 
thrown around these impersonal records and documents, effective enforce-
ment of many federal and state laws would be impossible.”186 Unlike other 
criminal investigations, in corporate crime or white collar cases the most 
crucial evidence may be in the possession of the corporation. Early cases 
required production if the documents in question were corporate rather 
than personal, meaning that a custodian of business records serving the 
corporation could not object to turning such documents over.187 Later cases 
abandoned that distinction and found that collective entities were simply 
not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection.188 Nor, moreover, could the 
members of an entity claim privilege as to materials owned by the entity. 
Members could, however, claim individual privilege if asked to testify.189 
 
182 AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1182. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 1185. 
186 322 U.S. 694, 700 (1944). 
187 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 109-10 (1988); see also Bellis v. United States, 
417 U.S. 85, 90 (1974) (“[R]ecognition of [an] individual’s claim of privilege with respect to the 
financial records of the organization would substantially undermine the unchallenged rule that the 
organization itself is not entitled to claim any Fifth Amendment privilege, and largely frustrate 
legitimate governmental regulation of such organizations.”). 
188 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104-12 (describing evolution of the collective entity doctrine).  
189 See Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 128 (1957) (holding that a corporate custodian 
cannot be compelled to give oral testimony about where business records are located if the 
information would be self-incriminatory). 
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The Court ruled in Fisher v. United States in 1976 that the contents of 
business records are not ordinarily regarded as privileged because they are 
created voluntarily and without state compulsion.190 However, such records 
may be the subject of testimony if the custodian is asked to identify or 
authenticate the documents; if so, then this “act of production” may be 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.191  
The rule in Fisher obviates the need for the Hale rule that corporations 
lack Fifth Amendment rights. If business records themselves lack Fifth 
Amendment protection, then giving a corporation Fifth Amendment 
protection would have little practical meaning, since a corporation cannot 
itself be interrogated and cannot “speak” during an investigation. Moreover, 
the other privileges that a corporation does possess—such as attorney-client 
privilege, as the Court recognized in Upjohn Co. v. United States192—do not 
pose significant practical obstacles to law enforcement, which can reward 
cooperation, or even the waiver of privilege, when considering whether to 
provide a firm with leniency.193 
In 1988, the Supreme Court ruled in Braswell v. United States that the 
president of a company could be held in contempt for refusing to produce 
corporate records.194 As custodian, he could have immunity from testifying 
but not from producing document.195 The Court reiterated that giving 
corporations Fifth Amendment rights “would have a detrimental impact on 
the Government’s efforts to prosecute ‘white-collar crime,’ one of the most 
serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities.”196 Thus, in some 
respects, the Court’s refusal to apply the Fifth Amendment to entities 
eroded the rights of an organization’s individual members. 
Individuals have more protection against self-incrimination when they 
are called to testify about requested documents. In the more recent case of 
United States v. Hubbell, the Supreme Court stated that if officials do not 
 
190 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1976). 
191 See id. at 412-13 (noting that the production of documents could violate the Fifth 
Amendment if the production implicated authentication but finding it did not in this case). 
192 449 U.S. 383, 397 (1981). 
193 See Brandon L. Garrett, Corporate Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917, 927 (2008) 
(describing practices of prosecutors and agencies that may use cooperation, or the waiver of 
privilege, as a factor in deciding which firms should be treated with leniency). 
194 487 U.S. 99, 117 (1988) (affirming corporate custodians cannot resist subpoenas “on the 
ground that [the] act of production will be personally incriminating”). 
195 Id. at 116-17. 
196 Id. at 115. For criticism of the Court’s reasoning, see Note, Organizational Papers and the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REV. 640, 648 (1986) (“Because the fifth 
amendment is concerned with the integrity of the process of law enforcement, its effect on the 
success of prosecutions should be relatively unimportant.”). 
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know the precise location of documents, providing a response to a subpoena 
might be self-incriminating since the very act of production would disclose 
“the mental and physical steps necessary” to provide that “accurate inven-
tory.”197 However, the act-of-production defense still does not apply to a 
corporate officer asked to produce records.198 The “collective entity” rule 
still governs,199 preventing corporations from shielding themselves or their 
employees from criminal exposure. 
This reasoning simply does not fit the Supreme Court’s approach to 
other constitutional rights, particularly in the way that the corporations’ 
lack of constitutional protection also has the potential to deprive individuals 
of constitutional protection. In Part III, I argue that the Court has it wrong, 
since its analysis should focus on whether organizational standing interferes 
with effective litigation of individual rights, especially because extending 
Fifth Amendment rights to corporations will not meaningfully impede civil 
or criminal investigations. 
G. The Double Jeopardy Clause 
Outside of the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Supreme Court has 
extended other Fifth Amendment protections to corporations. The Court 
held in Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States in 1931 that the Takings Clause 
extended to a Russian corporation, entitling it to just compensation.200 As 
noted, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to corpora-
tions the same as it applies to individuals. Further, the Supreme Court held 
in 1977 in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co. that prosecuting a corpo-
ration for a second time after the reversal of an acquittal would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause.201 (The Court has never addressed whether the 
Double Jeopardy Clause applies to corporations, but seems to have assumed 
it.202) The Court in Martin Linen cited to the purposes of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause: to protect one from “personal strain,”203 the “embarrassment, 
 
197 530 U.S. 27, 42-43 (2000). 
198 See id. at 36 (“[Respondent] could not avoid compliance with the subpoena served on him 
merely because the demanded [corporate] documents contained incriminating evidence . . . .”). 
199 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104 (explaining collective entities such as corporations are not 
treated like individuals).  
200 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931). 
201 430 U.S. 564, 567 (1977). 
202 See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (per curiam) (concluding that 
trying the petitioners, one of which was a corporation, for a second time after acquittal would 
violate the Fifth Amendment). 
203 430 U.S. at 569 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971)). 
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expense and ordeal,”204 and “anxiety and insecurity” of another trial,205 
without justifying how those reasons could or should apply to corporations.  
H. Fines: The Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and Due Process 
The story of jury trial rights of corporations is consistent with the larger 
story I tell in this Article. Federal courts have recognized both Sixth 
Amendment jury trial rights in criminal cases and Seventh Amendment 
jury trial rights in civil cases.206 One could argue that corporations do not 
require a jury of their peers or a community voice in a civil or a criminal 
trial. On the other hand, when a corporation can sue and be sued, perhaps 
having decided the question of standing, we can see why the court would 
then assume that any litigant should receive the same trial protections. The 
principle of jury trial rights for organizations has been extended in both the 
civil and criminal contexts, but in ways that limit fines in cases of particular 
interest to corporations.  
The jury trial right itself is unexceptional. The substantive interpretation 
of the Sixth Amendment, though, provides more meaningful protections to 
corporations, but it does not arise at all from the fact that corporations have 
Sixth Amendment rights. It arose first in the Court’s landmark 2000 
decision Apprendi v. New Jersey, which interpreted the Sixth Amendment to 
require certain sentencing facts to be charged to the jury.207 The Supreme 
Court in its 2012 decision Southern Union Co. v. United States held that a 
criminal fine imposed on a corporation for environmental violations violated 
the Sixth Amendment rights of the corporation, where the fine was imposed 
in excess of the statutory maximum based on facts not charged to the 
jury.208  
The case involved illegal storage of a hazardous material, liquid mercury, 
under environmental statutes that based the fine on the number of days that 
 
204 Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)). 
205 Id. (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88). 
206 See United States v. R. L. Polk & Co., 438 F.2d 377, 380 (6th Cir. 1971) (reducing the 
penalty on a corporation because a jury trial had not been granted nor the right to a jury trial 
waived); United States v. Greenpeace, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1261 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (assuming 
corporations have the right to trial by jury, but ultimately rejecting the right in this case because 
the potential penalty was not severe enough); see also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 838 (1994) (“We conclude that the serious contempt fines imposed here 
were criminal and constitutionally could not be imposed absent a jury trial.”); Ross v. Bernhard, 
396 U.S. 531, 542 (1970) (noting that a shareholder would have the same right to a jury trial as a 
corporation); Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56, 73 (1908) (discussing the Sixth 
Amendment right to have a jury trial in the state where the alleged crime occurred). 
207 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
208 132 S. Ct. 2344, 2357 (2012). 
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the violation lasted.209 The number of days in question was not included in 
the indictment, and the judge did not ask the jury to make a finding on the 
precise number of days.210 The Supreme Court had never said before that 
criminal fines must be calculated based on a jury finding facts “beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” The Government argued that the reasoning of Apprendi 
was based on the idea that the role of the jury is crucial where there is a 
“physical deprivation of liberty.”211 Unlike individuals, companies can only 
be fined, not jailed. However, the Court noted that “[w]hile the punish-
ments at stake in those [prior] cases were imprisonment or a death sentence, 
we see no principled basis under Apprendi for treating criminal fines differ-
ently.”212 The Court added that “[c]riminal fines, like these other forms of 
punishment, are penalties inflicted by the sovereign for the commission of 
offenses. Fines were by far the most common form of noncapital punish-
ment in colonial America.”213 The Court found that fines are particularly 
important in prosecutions of “organizational defendants who cannot be 
imprisoned.”214 The Court noted that in 2011, “a fine was imposed on 9.0% 
of individual defendants and on 70.6% of organizational defendants in the 
federal system.”215 
That ruling also impacts cases in which an individual is sentenced and 
must pay a large fine. The case happened to involve a corporation, and the 
Court noted that corporations chiefly pay fines, but the interpretation of the 
Sixth Amendment was formally neutral.216 Other rulings proceed similarly 
when examining constitutional questions surrounding fines. Do corpora-
tions have Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment? The Court has not reached that question.217 Instead, the Court 
has extended the Due Process Clause to regulate “fines” in the civil context 
 
209 Id. at 2349. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 2351. 
212 Id. at 2350. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 2350 n.2. 
216 For a more in-depth discussion of Southern Union and its implications for corporate criminal 
prosecutions and white collar prosecutions more broadly, see GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra 
note 175, at 196-200. 
217 See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276 n.22 
(1989) (“We shall not decide . . . whether the Eighth Amendment protects corporations as well as 
individuals.”). But see id. at 285 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting 
that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to corporations). 
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by placing constitutional limits on punitive damages awards.218 The Court’s 
rulings do not ask whether corporations have standing to challenge arbitrary 
jury awards of punitive damages. The Court nevertheless comes close to 
considering corporate-specific factors when assessing excessiveness of 
punitive damages awards.219 
I. Structural Provisions 
Finally, corporations have asserted challenges based on structural provisions 
of the Constitution. In these cases, where a company raises a separation-of-
powers issue as a defense in litigation, courts have entertained the challenges 
without comment.220 
III. INCORPORATION OF SUBSTANTIVE CORPORATE RIGHTS 
When can an organization litigate an injury to the entity? The question 
should be viewed as a threshold question of Article III standing. The 
Supreme Court has not often articulated the question in standing terms—
recall the very brief reference to standing by Chief Justice Roberts in 
Citizens United221—but many of its corporate constitutional rights rulings 
predate modern standing jurisprudence. I argue that an Article III standing 
framework provides a useful guide to understanding whether an organiza-
tion can litigate constitutional rights.  
 
218 See generally Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 357 (2007); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 
580 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1991). 
219 For example, the bar on permitting the jury to consider “harm caused strangers to the 
litigation” for purposes of assessing injuries, but permitting those considerations measuring 
reprehensibility, would tend to arise far more often with an organizational defendant. Philip 
Morris, 549 U.S. at 357; see also State Farm, 538 U.S. at 424 (calling evidence concerning reprehen-
sibility “tangential,” including investigation regarding “the manner in which State Farm’s policies 
corrupted its employees”). 
220 See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 56-57 (1982) 
(considering a corporation’s Article III separation-of-powers challenge to the structure contem-
plated by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978). For discussion of the case, see Martin H. Redish & Peter 
B. Siegal, Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the Fashionable Art of Corporation Bashing, 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1455 (2013) (reviewing TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012)) (“The holding that an injured 
corporation has standing to object to a constitutional violation of the separation of powers was so 
well established that the Court took plaintiff ’s standing for granted.”). For a general discussion of 
standing for individual litigants to raise challenges regarding structural provisions of the 
Constitution, see generally Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 
1435 (2013). 
221 See 130 S. Ct. at 919 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (mentioning that Citizens United had 
standing because it was injured by enforcement of the statute). 
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The Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must be able to show a cog-
nizable “injury in fact” to have a case or controversy that may be heard by 
an  Article III court.222 The Court recently summarized its Article III test as 
follows: an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; 
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable 
ruling.”223 Moreover, the Court has emphasized that “[t]he party invoking 
federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”224 
Two lines of cases are particularly crucial to the question of constitu-
tional litigation by organizations. First, one line of cases holds that organi-
zations can raise constitutional rights by asserting a concrete injury to its 
own interests but not those of others. Second, and in contrast, the Supreme 
Court adopts a more flexible test for associations and membership organiza-
tions that permits standing to assert the potentially broader interests of 
individual members. Relatedly, in a line of prudential third-party non–
Article III standing cases largely developed in the context of individual 
litigation, the Court has long held that a litigant typically does not have 
standing to vindicate the constitutional rights of a third party absent some 
special relationship and some special barrier to the non-party litigating the 
right.225 There are complexities to that body of Article III and prudential 
standing doctrine, and there are resulting questions over what qualifies as an 
organization versus an association and how to treat nonprofit corporations 
or religious nonprofits. I will address those questions in turn. 
A. Associational Standing 
The Supreme Court’s test for associational standing remains permissive 
and broad. The Court in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson emphasized the 
common interests of members of an association and described how the 
association is “but the medium through which its individual members seek 
to make more effective the expression of their own views.”226 The Court 
 
222 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (noting that Article III 
requires that a plaintiff show he has suffered an injury in fact).  
223 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010). 
224 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. 
225 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991) (“In the ordinary course, a litigant must 
assert his or her own legal rights and interests . . . .”); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977) (“In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to 
assert the rights of third persons.”). 
226 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975) (“The associa-
tion must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened 
injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the 
members themselves brought suit.”).  
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directed the judge to focus on whether the relief sought would reasonably 
benefit the members of the organization, whether “the interests it seeks to 
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose,”227 whether one or more 
members would have standing to sue individually, and whether there are 
issues of “individualized proof,” permitting the claims to be “properly 
resolved in a group context.”228 Thus, the Court has emphasized that it can 
be preferable to have an association sue for consequentialist reasons. The 
Court in UAW v. Brock noted that “an association suing to vindicate the 
interests of its members can draw upon a pre-existing reservoir of expertise 
and capital.”229 
The test for associational standing does not closely examine the governance 
of the group. The association need not even be a traditional membership 
organization. It may sue if “for all practical purposes” it serves the interests 
of others.230 As the Court put it in Brock, “[t]he very forces that cause 
individuals to band together in an association will thus provide some 
guarantee that the association will work to promote their interests.”231  
What Article III limit is there on the ability of an association to stand in 
for the constitutional rights of its members? The Court has merely noted 
that if there was evidence that an association did not “represent adequately 
the interests of all their injured members,” then there would be a due 
process problem with permitting a judgment by the association to bind the 
members in subsequent litigation.232 Further, the Court has held that if the 
underlying claim or relief requested requires individual participation, then 
associational standing is not proper.233 As a result, there may be sound 
reasons to treat nonprofit organizations and other types of organizations as 
associations if they, like membership organizations, represent the viewpoints 
of individuals. However, as discussed next, a for-profit corporation cannot 
do so given its legal structure and lacks the ability to litigate injury to 
others. 
Some have criticized decisions like Citizens United for appearing to privi-
lege associations and organizations. For example, Professor Wayne Batchis 
 
227 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). 
228 Id. at 343-44 (describing three-part test for associational standing). 
229 477 U.S. 274, 289 (1986). 
230 Hunt, 432 U.S. at 344; see Karl S. Coplan, Is Voting Necessary? Organizational Standing and 
Non-Voting Members of Environmental Advocacy Organizations, 14 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 47, 
75 (2005) (noting that the holdings of the Court suggest there can be associational standing even 
“without a formal voting membership”). 
231 477 U.S. at 290. 
232 Id. 
233 Hunt, 423 U.S. at 343; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 (1980).  
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complains, “the freedom of association has become a freedom of the associa-
tion.”234 However, there are policy reasons that support allowing an associa-
tion to stand in for the interests of members.235 The reasons are similar to 
the reasons why class action practice permits injured individuals to gather 
together and sue in the aggregate.236 Aggregate litigation can provide more 
effective representation, attract better resources for the litigation, and make 
it feasible to litigate individual injuries that would not be economically 
feasible to litigate individually.237  
B. Organizational Standing 
Organizational standing analysis is quite different than associational 
standing analysis. When an organization sues to assert its own interests, 
which are necessarily distinct from those of its shareholders or owners, the 
Article III inquiry proceeds by asking whether the entity itself suffered a 
“concrete injury” to its own interests, apart from any separately identified 
injury to third parties, such as employees, officers, owners, or shareholders.238 
To be sure, more is required than an abstract “interest in a problem,” in 
order to satisfy the first “concrete injury” element of the analysis. For 
example, the Court famously held in Sierra Club v. Morton that under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, “a mere ‘interest in a problem,’ no matter 
how longstanding the interest and no matter how qualified the organization 
is in evaluating the problem, is not sufficient by itself.”239 As a matter of 
Article III standing, the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife held that a 
 
234 Wayne Batchis, Citizens United and the Paradox of “Corporate Speech”: From Freedom of 
Association to Freedom of the Association, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 5, 7 (2012). 
235 See Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, supra note 33, at 637-38 (describing indi-
vidualized constitutional remedies and their impact); see also Heidi Li Feldman, Note, Divided We 
Fall: Associational Standing and Collective Interest, 87 MICH. L. REV. 733, 744-45 (1988) (advocating 
theory of “collective standing”). 
236 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendments (“Subdi-
vision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, 
effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without 
sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.”); Mace v. Van Ru 
Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action . . . . A class action solves this problem by aggregating the 
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s . . . labor.”). 
237 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.03 
(2010) (supporting aggregate treatment under given conditions). 
238 See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972); see also Havens Realty Corp. v. 
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 n.19 (1982) (“[O]rganizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf 
for injuries they have sustained.”).  
239 405 U.S. at 739. 
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plaintiff organization must provide the court with “a factual showing of 
perceptible harm.”240  
A second related principle has been less well developed in the case law. 
Not only must the organization claim an injury to the interests of the 
organization, but the particular harm that the corporation suffers must also 
implicate or be caused by the violation of the right being asserted by the 
entity. This is where, I argue, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby 
began to get it wrong by ignoring such requirements and casting further 
doubt on whether prior rulings in cases like Sierra Club and Lujan were so 
principled after all. 
1. The Hobby Lobby Decision 
In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court ruled on the question whether the 
contraception mandate in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
burdens a corporation’s right to religious exercise under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.241 The status of corporate standing was 
prominent in the confusion in the pre–Hobby Lobby lower court rulings 
concerning challenges to the Affordable Care Act’s contraception mandate. 
Some lower courts had held that free exercise claims, although only individuals 
can themselves exercise religious practices, can be asserted by organizations 
on a derivative or third-party theory of prudential standing,242 while others 
disagreed and held that free exercise claims are purely personal or cannot be 
litigated by secular organizations.243 Some opinions instead emphasized that 
 
240 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992). 
241 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2765 (2014). 
242 See, e.g., Commack Self-Serv. Kosher Meats, Inc. v. Hooker, 680 F.3d 194, 212 (2d Cir. 
2012) (finding no Free Exercise Clause violation when the challenged act is “neutral, generally 
applicable, minimally burdensome, and has a rational basis”); Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 586 F.3d 
1109, 1120 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have held that a corporation has standing to assert the free 
exercise right of its owners. . . . [A]n organization that asserts the free exercise rights of its owners 
need not be primarily religious . . . .”). The Tenth Circuit badly fractured in a decision concerning 
the standing of a corporation to assert free exercise rights in opposing contraception coverage for 
employees, including under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), but there was 
somewhat more agreement on the question of standing. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 
723 F.3d 1114, 1154 (10th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“I do not understand the 
government or any of my colleagues to dispute the Greens’ Article III standing.”). But see id. at 
1162 (Bacharach, J., concurring) (“I believe we should instruct the district court to dismiss the 
Greens’ claims under the shareholder-standing rule.”); id. at 1177 (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (agreeing with Judge Bacharach’s concurring opinion on the issue of 
standing).  
243 See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (“When it comes to corporate entities, only religious organizations are accorded the 
protections of the [Free Exercise] Clause.”); Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. 
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if a regulation costs money for a corporation to comply with or creates 
financial penalties for noncompliance, then the company may challenge the 
regulation, even if the particular constitutional right is not one that relates 
to a financial interest.244 Several lower courts had also addressed whether 
the ACA burdens a First Amendment religious exercise right: the Seventh 
and Tenth Circuits have entertained the claim,245 while the D.C. Circuit has 
found “no basis for concluding a secular organization can exercise reli-
gion.”246 The Tenth Circuit in Hobby Lobby briefly stated that the companies 
had standing to litigate the First Amendment and statutory claims because 
they “face an imminent loss of money, traceable to the contraceptive-
coverage requirement,” but that court did not describe any harm to the 
plaintiff corporation’s asserted right to free exercise.247 That reasoning 
instead corresponded with the government’s position in the Affordable Care 
Act litigation, which asserts that only the owners of companies can claim an 
injury to free exercise rights, on their own behalf, while the corporation 
must comply with the Act.248  
Writing for the majority in Hobby Lobby, Justice Alito rejected that rea-
soning initially by stating that “[t]he plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly 
clear that Congress did not discriminate in this way against men and women 
who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner 
required by their religious beliefs.”249 Others may debate, as Justice Ginsburg 
 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 388 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding, without conducting a 
standing analysis, that “the free exercise claims of a company’s owners cannot ‘pass through’ to the 
corporation”). The Supreme Court expressed doubt on the subject in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 
297, 321 (1980), where the Court noted that a free exercise challenge in the context of associational 
standing analysis is “one that ordinarily requires individual participation.” 
244 See Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 667 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The threat of financial penalty 
and other enforcement action is easily sufficient to establish standing to challenge the mandate 
prior to its enforcement.”); Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126 (finding Article III standing, noting that 
“[b]oth companies face an imminent loss of money, traceable to the contraceptive-coverage 
requirement”). 
245 See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1135 (“We see no reason the Supreme Court would recognize 
constitutional protection for a corporation’s political expression but not its religious expression.”); 
see also Grote v. Sebelius, 708 F.3d 850, 854-55 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiffs, a family 
and its private business, had a likelihood of success under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
and would not be forced to follow the contraception mandate in the ACA). 
246 See Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1215; see also Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 385 (determining that for-profit, 
secular corporations cannot exercise religion). 
247 See Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1126.  
248 See Defendants’ Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 18, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (W.D. Okla. 2012) 
(No. Civ. 12-1000) (arguing plaintiff “cannot establish a substantial burden on his religious exercise 
by invoking [a] trickle-down theory”).  
249 134 S. Ct. at 2759. 
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did in dissent, whether that is a correct reading of RFRA’s text, which uses 
the term “persons” but does not detail which types of entities have standing 
to raise religious exercise objections to regulations.250  
However, what was a particularly stark departure was that the majority 
in Hobby Lobby acted as if answering the question of statutory standing 
(whether Congress intended to allow for-profit corporate persons to sue) 
was sufficient, without so much as addressing the question of the Article III 
organizational standing of the three plaintiff corporations. The Court not 
only avoided reaching the First Amendment claim raised by the parties,251 
but the Court was completely silent on the question of Article III standing. 
The issue was not strongly pressed by the parties, but it was mentioned at 
oral arguments,252 and it was an important subject of lower court rulings, as 
described.253  
Moreover, it is a federal court’s Article III obligation to ensure that 
standing is present, while it is the plaintiff ’s burden to show standing. None 
other than Chief Justice Roberts, then a practicing lawyer, defended the 
Court’s decision in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife in a lengthy law review 
article by pointing out that, even though Congress provided statutory 
standing under the Endangered Species Act, the plaintiffs lacked Article III 
standing, and citing to the importance of the “injury in fact” requirements 
as part of an important “judicial self-restraint” and reliance on precedent.254  
If so, then by way of contrast, Hobby Lobby’s failure to address whether 
the three for-profit corporations could make out an “injury in fact” was 
inconsistent with precedent. In order to have corporate standing, the 
company itself must articulate more than a “mere interest” in the subject 
matter of contraceptive coverage, and more than the fact that complying 
with the regulation costs money, since complying with all regulations cost 
money. The majority opinion did address cost, calling compliance with the 
regulations “costly,” with “severe” economic consequences, and calling it “far 
from clear” that a company might actually save money by paying the 
penalty under the statute and dropping coverage.255 To be sure, the statute 
 
250 Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Until this litigation, no decision of this Court 
recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a religious exemption from a generally 
applicable law, whether under the Free Exercise Clause or RFRA. . . . [T]he exercise of religion is 
characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.”). 
251 Id. at 2785 (majority opinion) (“Our decision on that statutory question makes it unneces-
sary to reach the First Amendment claim . . . .”). 
252 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 75-79, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354). 
253 See supra notes 242, 244, 247 and accompanying text. 
254 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1229 (1993). 
255 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775, 2777. 
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does regulate insurance coverage by corporations. But again, that compli-
ance with a statute or regulation costs money does not give rise to a claim, 
unless there is a separate constitutional or statutory deficiency with the 
statute or regulation. In Hobby Lobby, the corporations would have to show 
some “injury” to their religious exercise. How could they do so, except by 
invoking the beliefs and rights of the separate owners of the corporation?  
The dissent argued, citing to Justice Stevens’s opinion in Citizens United, 
that corporations literally “have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no 
thoughts, no desires.”256 Justice Ginsburg argued: “the exercise of religion is 
characteristic of natural persons, not artificial legal entities.”257 Furthermore, 
the majority in Hobby Lobby addressed the separate claims brought by the 
individual owners themselves;258 the notion that the owners could sue on 
behalf of legally separate corporations would raise still more problematic 
issues of third-party standing. 
2. Hobby Lobby’s Implications for Corporate Standing 
Without actually addressing Article III standing, Justice Alito did sug-
gest that the corporations themselves could possess “religious beliefs” that 
would be harmed by regulations that “in effect tell the plaintiffs that their 
beliefs are flawed.”259 Throughout the majority opinion, Justice Alito 
emphasized that both the owners “and their companies sincerely believe” 
that providing contraceptive coverage violates “their religious beliefs.”260 On 
the thinnest ground of all, Justice Alito cited to the 1961 Braunfeld v. Brown 
decision as an example of the Court’s supposed recognition that “a sole 
proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a free exercise 
claim.”261 That was the only effort to suggest that the Court had found 
standing to assert free exercise claims by a for-profit. Braunfeld involved five 
merchants, all sole proprietors, challenging a Sunday business closing law.262 
A sole proprietorship is nothing like a corporation; it is unincorporated, run 
by a single person, and is not in any way separate from that single owner.263 
 
256 Id. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 972 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 2764-65 (majority opinion). 
259 Id. at 2778. 
260 Id. at 2779. 
261 Id. at 2770. 
262 Id. at 2767. 
263 See, e.g., Sole Proprietorship, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.sba.gov/content/sole-proprietorship-0 (last visited Dec. 15, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/9EH2-BY6E. 
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Moreover, Braunfeld never discussed the fact that any of the merchants were 
sole proprietors and neither did another 1961 case cited by the majority, 
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc.264 In that case, 
which included a corporation and five individual challengers,265 the Court 
had no reason to discuss standing. The decision pre-dated modern Article 
III standing jurisprudence, and, in contrast to the misleading way that 
Justice Alito quoted from the case, the Court in Braunfeld had dismissed the 
free exercise claims of the merchants finding insufficient injury where the 
law only made business “more expensive” for them.266 The Court in Gal-
lagher simply relied on the reasoning in Braunfeld without addressing 
standing.267 
The Hobby Lobby majority suggested that corporations can exercise reli-
gion on behalf of their owners, or as a pass-through for the rights of the 
owners. Justice Alito emphasized that the purpose of a corporation “is to 
provide protection for human beings,” adding that “[a] corporation is simply 
a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends.”268 
Justice Alito’s discussion of corporate constitutional rights is particularly 
troubling for its potential implications in cases in which a court reaches the 
substance of a constitutional claim. The reasoning suggests that a corpora-
tion may claim a constitutional right so long as individuals might indirectly 
benefit from the litigation, regardless of whether there is any direct injury 
to the corporate litigant itself.269 Such an approach ignores the corporate 
form and would undo Article III standing (and in the process, call into 
question the occasions in which the Court has denied standing to, for 
example, nonprofit organizations).  
Justice Alito then noted that Fourth Amendment protection of corpora-
tions can also protect privacy interests of employees.270 That much is 
partially accurate; in fact, the Supreme Court has long ruled that under the 
Fourth Amendment “neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations 
can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.”271 Justice 
Alito then cited to the Takings Clause, stating that protecting corporations 
 
264 366 U.S. 617 (1961). 
265 Id. at 618. 
266 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). 
267 Gallagher, 366 U.S. at 631 (“Since the decision in that case rejects the contentions pre-
sented by these appellees on the merits, we need not decide whether appellees have standing to 
raise these questions.”). 
268 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
269 See, e.g., id. (“When rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corpora-
tions, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people.”). 
270 See id. 
271 United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
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from “seizure of their property without just compensation” also protects the 
financial stake of the owners.272 To be sure, as described in Part I, the 
Supreme Court has found that a wide range of constitutional rights apply to 
corporations, including rights that might typically be litigated by individuals.  
The real leap in Hobby Lobby occurred where Justice Alito concluded 
that protecting free exercise rights of corporations also protects “the 
religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies.”273 
That reasoning conflates associational and organizational standing, and it 
assumes that corporations and individuals can have common “beliefs” just as 
they can have common privacy or financial interests. A corporation itself is 
injured if its premises are searched as part of a civil or criminal investigation 
targeting the corporation itself or if its property is taken without compensa-
tion. A separate corporation lacks the relevant free exercise injury, since it 
lacks “religious liberty” as a for-profit corporation; Justice Alito would have 
had to do hard work to justify such a claim, beyond citing to views of the 
owners. In contrast, a nonprofit religious organization, functioning in effect 
as an association, exists to permit religious exercise of members274: as the 
Court puts it, “[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in 
large measure from participation in a larger religious community.”275 For the 
Court to suggest that a for-profit company is no different than a non-profit 
or an association or a religious entity, and that these distinctions are “quite 
beside the point,”276 ignores the relevance of the corporate form entirely. 
In the process of making these unfounded claims, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the corporate form itself is irrelevant to the question of 
Article III standing, calling into question each of the entrenched distinc-
tions in the case law between associational and organizational standing. 
Moreover, the Court disregarded the fundamental feature of state corporate 
law: separation of ownership from the entity. The corporation is legally 
separate from owners, officers, employees, shareholders, or other constituents; 
the corporation does not litigate on behalf of its owners’ personal interests, 
but rather out of a duty to maximize corporate profits, returns to owners or 
 
272 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. 
273 Id. 
274 See Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. 
REV. 917, 957 (2013) (arguing that churches should be treated as voluntary associations rather than 
corporations for purposes of standing).  
275 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
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shareholders generally, or other corporate goals.277 To be sure, at times the 
Court suggested that its holding was limited to for-profit and closely held 
corporations, taking pains to emphasize that for-profit companies may 
pursue “worthy objectives” like charitable causes or the public interest, in 
addition to profit-seeking.278 The Court suggested that any contrary argu-
ment “flies in the face of modern corporate law.”279  
However, nothing could be more fundamental to modern corporate law 
than the complete separation of the owners from the legal entity itself. As 
the Supreme Court put it in J. J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, “[u]ndoubtedly 
a corporation is, in law, a person or entity entirely distinct from its stock-
holders and officers.”280 Similarly, as the Court stated in Cedric Kushner 
Promotions, Ltd. v. King, “incorporation’s basic purpose is to create a distinct 
legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different 
from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own it, or whom it 
employs.”281 Contrary to the majority’s statement in Hobby Lobby, there is a 
“sharp line” between nonprofits, religious organizations, and for-profits, and 
the Court attempted to blur that line in ways that have very troubling 
implications for corporate law generally.282 Far from being “quite beside the 
point,” legal separateness is the point of creating a corporation.  
To be sure, the Supreme Court could have made far better supported 
arguments, limiting the reasoning perhaps to family-owned closely held 
corporations. Several lower courts did so, addressing the standing question 
in careful detail;283 as discussed, however, that reasoning would likely have 
to rely on a notion of prudential third-party standing, which itself poses real 
problems given the potentially conflicting interests of third parties to the 
litigation. The Court should have engaged in the required Article III 
analysis as the lower courts had more conscientiously done, perhaps avoiding 
unnecessary language suggestive of standing for corporations generally. 
A brief analogy to representation in aggregate litigation may also be 
helpful. A showing limited to a financial interest in the litigation would not 
be sufficient to establish standing under the class action rules because a 
 
277 See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(a) (1994) 
(describing how “a corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities with a 
view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain” (citation omitted)).  
278 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2770-71. 
279 Id. at 2770. 
280 216 U.S. 504, 514 (1910). 
281 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001). 
282 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771. 
283 See generally Beckwith Elec. Co. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 3284604, at *4-11 (M.D. Fla. June 
25, 2013); Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 115-19 (D.D.C. 2012). 
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court would be obligated to scrutinize adequacy of representation by the 
representative litigants based on due process concerns.284 Class actions raise 
different issues than organizational litigation, and to be sure, state corpora-
tion law separately defines and protects the interests of owners and share-
holders in an organization. Whether an organization or association should 
add something to the question of standing, as the Court has often held, is 
very difficult to square with the treatment of class actions by individuals, 
which in contrast, the Court has suggested adds nothing to the question of 
standing.285 Perhaps the Court should revisit organizational standing 
jurisprudence to ensure that there is in fact adequacy of representation 
comporting with Article III and due process requirements. Such due 
process principles concerning exercise of organizational rights in conflict 
with, or even at the expense of, an individual’s day in court still operate 
tacitly, even if not fully developed in the doctrine. In certain situations in 
which the underlying constitutional right creates tension between an 
association or organization and individuals, the Supreme Court has been 
unwilling to permit litigation by the organization. Prudential standing 
concerns, as well as concerns regarding the due process rights of individual 
litigants, may also explain why the Court should be unwilling to so broadly 
recognize constitutional rights of organizations in the additional contexts to 
which I turn next. 
C. Third-Party Standing 
Some rights may not be asserted by an organization, and the Supreme 
Court’s prudential or non–Article III third-party standing doctrine helps to 
explain why. The Court has articulated its test as follows: “Ordinarily, one 
may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights 
of some third party,”286 but a third party has standing when there is (1) some 
injury to the party litigating the right, (2) a close relationship to the 
 
284 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). If individual people joined together to seek damages, they 
must show that common issues of law and fact predominate, among other requirements in Rule 23. 
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). In contrast, such a showing is not required in a suit seeking to enjoin 
an unconstitutional government action or policy. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). In damages actions, 
as the Advisory Committee noted when the modern federal class action rule was adopted in 1966, 
“[i]t is only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-
action device.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendments. 
285 See Garrett, Aggregation and Constitutional Rights, supra note 33, at 637 (“There is a great 
deal of tension between the Court’s treatment of associations and with class actions.”). In cases 
requesting equitable remedies, the Court has often insisted that a class action “adds nothing to the 
question of standing.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976)).  
286 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953). 
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nonparty whose rights are directly being litigated, and (3) some obstacle to 
that nonparty litigating, such that fundamental rights might otherwise go 
unprotected.287  
The Supreme Court has permitted parties to assert the rights of third 
parties with whom they have a close relationship, including permitting 
doctors to sue to assert constitutional rights of patients and vendors the 
rights of customers.288 In such cases, the litigants first had to show sufficient 
injury in fact to themselves, that is, a claim that their own constitutional 
rights were impaired. Those were not typically cases involving organizations 
(although one example, Craig v. Boren, is a case involving a bar owner’s 
equal protection challenge to a liquor law289). One might expect a court to 
rule that because individuals who suffer the injury directly can sue, there is 
no need to permit a third-party organization to sue unless it is an associa-
tion, or unless there is some special justification for permitting third-party 
standing. Examples include the special nature of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship, an advocacy relationship combined with a strong assurance that 
the third party is “fully, or very nearly” as effective an advocate for the 
constitutional right, or some reason why a claim by the individual party 
would evade review.290 One can imagine that an owner of a closely held 
corporation might be an effective advocate for the corporation itself, but 
what about the health benefits of the employees and their dependents? 
A mere economic effect of a regulation on the corporation should not 
permit the corporation to assert the constitutional rights of third parties 
 
287 See 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3 (3d ed. 2008) (“[I]t is increasingly common to 
state that third-party standing requires three elements: an injury in fact to a party, a close 
relationship to the nonparty whose rights are asserted, and some significant obstacle that impedes 
the nonparty’s assertion of his own rights.”); see also Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 397-400 
(1998) (permitting third-party standing where the three preconditions had been satisfied). 
288 See, e.g., Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 433 (1998) (granting standing to daughter to 
pursue father’s gender discrimination claim); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195 (1976) (allowing 
vendor to bring action to protect rights of vendee); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976) 
(allowing physician to litigate on behalf of patient for right to abortion).  
289 Craig v. Boren involved a business owner of a bar protesting unequal treatment of 18-20 
year-old males under an Oklahoma liquor law. 429 U.S. at 192. The appellant Craig turned 21 
before the case reached the Court; it was a case that might otherwise evade review. Id. The Court 
noted that the statute was directed toward compliance by such vendors, but more importantly, that 
the vendor would be an effective “advocate[]” for the separate interests of the third parties. Id. at 
195-97. 
290 See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 115; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445 (1972) (“[T]he rela-
tionship between Baird and those whose rights he seeks to assert is not simply that between a 
distributor and potential distributees, but that between an advocate of the rights of persons to 
obtain contraceptives and those desirous of doing so.”).  
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absent a strong showing that the harm affected the close relationship.291 
Moreover, not only must there be a showing that there is no conflict 
between the interests of, say, the seller and buyer,292 but there must be a 
showing that the third prong of the prudential standing test is met: that the 
third party faces some obstacle to litigating the rights on his own.293 
The prudential standing test is discretionary and is not a model of clarity, 
but its application is dependent on the suitability of the particular constitu-
tional rights for assertion by others. As to the second prong of the test, 
corporations are not likely to be effective advocates of a range of constitu-
tional rights in which they cannot share an interest. As the Supreme Court 
noted in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, “[c]ertain ‘purely personal’ 
guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are 
unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the ‘historic 
function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of 
individuals.”294 What explains the characterization of certain rights, such as 
self-incrimination liberty rights, citizenship rights, and Privileges and 
Immunities Clause rights as “purely personal?” The organization may not 
itself have standing to assert a harm if, for example, harm suffered by 
employees or other constituents typically cannot be delegated to the legal 
entity based on underlying substantive law. Some rights are not delegable to 
organizations or to other individuals. Property is delegable. Voting rights 
are not delegable to third parties. Jury service is not delegable. Marriage 
rights are not delegable. The Court, as discussed, has held Fifth Amend-
ment self-incrimination rights are not delegable. If the Court recognized 
Fifth Amendment rights of corporations, the corporation still would not be 
able to assert the Fifth Amendment rights of an individual employee, who 
after all, could be separately prosecuted, and unlike the corporation, could 
be sentenced to a prison term. Not only is a corporation legally separate, 
but courts should not recognize third-party standing if doing so would 
undermine rights of individuals.  
 
291 This is where I part company with the general claim that any economic injury to a corpo-
rate plaintiff provides Article III standing, briefly made in Hall & Means, supra note 29, at 154. 
Their focus, however, is the more limited claim that the owners of a “family-owned business” have 
special status and ability to litigate on behalf of the corporation. Id. That argument also hinges on 
whether there are in fact “significant obstacles” to others separately litigating any violations of 
their own constitutional rights. Id. at 157-59. 
292 For examples, see WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 287, at § 3531.9.3 nn.46-57.  
293 See id. § 3531.9.3 (noting that “[a] party may be denied the opportunity to advance another’s 
interests when courts doubt the quality of the relationship, fear the party’s interests may diverge 
from the nonparty’s interests, suspect the party may be seeking general public-interest standing, or 
believe that specific rights are not suited to third-party standing”). 
294 435 U.S. 765, 778 n.14 (1978). 
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The Hobby Lobby decision raises troubling questions concerning the 
prudential doctrine of third-party standing. The Supreme Court, unlike 
many of the lower courts, failed to engage in any third-party standing 
analysis, treating the separate owners and the corporations as joined at the 
hip. However, the corporations were, on one theory, asserting the free 
exercise interests of third parties: the owners of a for-profit corporation. To 
properly address the question, the Court had to do more than show some 
injury to the party litigating the right; the Court also had to show (2) a 
close relationship to the nonparty, and (3) some obstacle to that party 
litigating such that the rights might otherwise go unprotected.  
Perhaps only a closely held family-owned corporation could show such a 
close relationship; that would be the narrower reading of Hobby Lobby, and 
that was how some lower courts approached the question.295 As the Court 
put it in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, “much more is needed” to show 
standing if the particular injury asserted by a plaintiff affects “someone 
else.”296 This is so where the injury can “hinge on the response of the 
regulated (or regulable) third party to the government action or inaction—
and perhaps on the response of others as well.”297 In Lujan, the “special 
interest” of the members of the organization was not sufficiently “directly” 
or “imminent[ly]” affected by the action of the federal agency.298 And yet in 
Hobby Lobby, there was no organization with members, but rather it was the 
religious beliefs of the separate owners that gave rise to the claim. The 
Court did not discuss third-party standing or reach the question whether 
the owners could bring separate claims. If the owners could not separately 
sue, perhaps due to a lack of the requisite injury in fact, then there would be 
a stronger argument for prudential third-party standing.299 However, there 
were separate interests requiring consideration: those of nonparty employees 
and their dependents. 
The interests of nonparty employees raise particularly troubling ques-
tions in the Hobby Lobby case. As Justice Ginsburg forcefully emphasized in 
the dissent, free exercise jurisprudence recognizes that accommodations to 
religious beliefs “must not significantly impinge on the interests of third 
 
295 See, e.g., Tyndale House Publishers, Inc. v. Sebelius, 904 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D.D.C. 
2012) (“Tyndale and the Foundation are closely-linked entities that share common religious 
objections . . . .”). 
296 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992). 
297 Id. 
298 Id. at 563-64. 
299 See Tyndale, 904 F. Supp. 2d at 119 (“The third-party standing doctrine serves to avoid 
such conundrums.”). 
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parties.”300 The employers could “deny legions of women who do not hold 
their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the ACA 
would otherwise secure,” as well as harming the interests of the dependents 
of employees.301 Moreover, only the independent decision by employees to 
seek out coverage implicates the supposed harm to religious beliefs; all that 
the employer is obligated to do is pay money into an undifferentiated 
fund.302 Conflicts of interest are inherent in recognizing free exercise rights 
of for-profit companies, Justice Ginsburg suggested, when those companies 
cannot by law discriminate in hiring based on religion.303 In contrast, 
religious organizations “exist to foster the interests of persons subscribing to 
the same religious faith.”304 Somehow that fundamental distinction simply 
“escapes the Court’s attention.”305 
The Hobby Lobby ruling also runs counter to the Supreme Court’s own 
prior statements regarding third-party suits by shareholders, although to be 
sure, the Court in Hobby Lobby delicately avoided the topic of public 
companies (calling free exercise litigation by “corporate giants” an “unlikely” 
event306), as well as the question whether the owners of the closely held 
corporations in the case could separately sue. State incorporation law 
protects rights of individuals with a stake in a corporation by permitting 
shareholders standing to litigate injuries to the corporation in derivative 
lawsuits, brought not on their own behalf, but on behalf of the corpora-
tion.307 In federal court, such actions are regulated to ensure the plaintiff 
really was a shareholder at the relevant time, to ensure fair and adequate 
representation of other shareholders, and other requirements imposed by 
Rule 23.1.308 The Supreme Court considered such rules for shareholder suits 
in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., suggesting 
without reaching the question that even if there is Article III standing, the 
“prudential requirements of the standing doctrine” might counsel against 
permitting standing by a corporation’s owners, if under state law those 
shareholders may not pursue an action where the management have de-
clined to do so in exercise of good-faith business judgment.309  
 
300 Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 2799. 
303 Id. at 2795-96. 
304 Id. at 2795. 
305 Id. at 2796. 
306 Id. at 2774 (majority opinion). 
307 For a digest of state law on the subject, see 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 484 (2013). 
308 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (describing prerequisites to filing a derivative action in federal court). 
309 493 U.S. 331, 336-38 (1990). 
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Shareholders are considered separate and unable to generally sue for 
injuries to the company; corporations cannot litigate the separate interests 
of shareholders and associations can only litigate the interests of members. 
For constitutional rights, when would delegation undermine the adequacy of 
an organization’s representation or conflict with the interests of the individuals 
for whom a right is primarily designed to protect or raise still additional 
prudential standing concerns? Consider the Fifth Amendment, defined by 
the Court as a person-specific privilege against self-incrimination. As 
described, the Court held in Hale v. Henkel that the Fifth Amendment 
cannot be asserted by an organization on behalf of individuals.310 Indeed, 
assertion of such a privilege by the organization might conflict with the 
rights of an individual facing prosecution. However, as noted, denying a 
corporate representative the right to assert the Fifth Amendment can take 
the rule so far so as to harm individual rights.  
In a class action, such a conflict might make the representation inade-
quate. The Supreme Court has been extremely vigilant in policing due 
process concerns in class action litigation, as well as compliance with the 
commands of Rule 23. Indeed many commentators argue that the Court has 
gone too far in unduly hampering effective class action litigation, with 
particular criticism directed toward the Court’s 2011 ruling in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).311 In associational standing cases, 
however, as discussed, the Supreme Court has noted that a representative 
suit does not bind nonmembers, and if there was a lack of adequacy of 
representation, the ruling might not preclude subsequent suits by members 
of the association for due process reasons.312 Similar due process concerns 
 
310 201 U.S. 43, 70 (1906). 
311 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 776 (2013) 
(arguing that the decision in Wal-Mart “cannot be squared with the text, structure, or history of 
Rule 23(a)(2)”); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 34, 45 (2011) (stating that Wal-Mart “reversed almost a half-
century of Title VII jurisprudence”); Erwin Chemerinsky, New Limits on Class Actions, TRIAL, 
Nov. 2011, at 54 (noting that “Wal-Mart has significant implications for all class action litigation in 
federal court”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Blocks Huge Class-Action Suit Against Wal-Mart, 
L.A. TIMES, June 21, 2011 (quoting law professor John Coffee’s comment that “it largely eliminates 
the monetary threat facing big employers”). 
312 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 (1992) (noting that the nonparty 
agencies could not be bound by the decision in the suit); see also United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 556 n.6 (1996) (“The germaneness of a 
suit to an association’s purpose may, of course, satisfy a standing requirement without necessarily 
rendering the association’s representation adequate to justify giving the association’s suit preclusive 
effect as against an individual ostensibly represented.”); Donald F. Simone, Note, Associational 
Standing and Due Process: The Need for an Adequate Representation Scrutiny, 61 B.U. L. REV. 174, 181 
(1981) (“Due process mandates that in an associational suit an individual member must either be 
adequately represented or be permitted to relitigate his claim in a subsequent suit.”). 
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animate the class action certification requirements under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.313 
For still additional constitutional rights, the injury to the corporation is 
not concrete under existing constitutional law. Thus, it would take an 
additional development in the underlying doctrine to clarify what would 
constitute a sufficient injury and why a corporation would have standing. In 
such cases, the question of standing does not simplify the inquiry because 
the constitutional right is unclear or requires development. For example, 
Darrell Miller has argued that corporations might have Second Amendment 
rights to bear arms after Citizens United.314 It is unclear why or what corpo-
rate interest would be harmed by a gun regulation. An individual person, 
such as an employee of a corporation, could bring a challenge under the 
Second Amendment to a firearms regulation, and perhaps an association 
could do the same on behalf of members. What corporate injury could exist 
is less clear, unless it was a firearms regulation that economically impacted 
the corporation—for example, a limit on the types of firearms that can be 
carried by a licensed private security firm or armored transport company.315 
D. Consequentialism and Not Reciprocity 
In corporate constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court has cited a 
reciprocity element to the analysis, drawing from the tradition of treating 
corporations as conditioned in their existence on the state: “businessmen 
engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the 
 
313 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(4); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 
815, 864 (1999) (finding error where nonparties were not adequately represented); Amchem 
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 627 (1997) (holding that class action settlements must 
provide “structural assurance of fair and adequate representation for the diverse groups and 
individuals affected”); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 
U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940)) (recognizing an exception to promissory estoppel where the nonparty’s 
interests are “adequately represented” by a party); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and 
Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 366 (“[A]dequate representation is a 
prerequisite for binding individuals to the outcome of a case . . . .”); Jonathan R. Macey & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic 
Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 84-96 (1991) (discussing the 
contours of the adequacy requirement to ensure proper due process protections); Jack B. 
Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 481 (1994) (comparing 
the obligations to claimants, defendants, and the public in class actions and mass tort litigation). 
314 See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011) (analyzing the extent of corporate 
Second Amendment rights under a range of different analytical perspectives).  
315 See id. at 942-43 (discussing various situations in which a corporation might have an 
interest in, and the potential to challenge, certain gun regulations).  
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burdens as well as the benefits of their trade.”316 In United States v. Morton 
Salt Co., the Court similarly noted that corporations “have a collective 
impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as 
artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of 
engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with 
them an enhanced measure of regulation.”317 Some scholars have viewed this 
as a matter of reciprocity, in the “grant” tradition. As Professor Andrew 
Taslitz has put it: “As long as corporations are treated like persons, corpora-
tions must endure . . . the same duties and penalties—including criminal 
punishment—that the rest of us do.”318 
I view such language slightly differently, not as about an implied condition 
of reciprocity, in the sense that corporations owe the state their existence 
and have privileges conditioned on legal behavior, but rather that litigation 
by and against organizations accomplishes consequentialist ends. Some have 
criticized such a view of reciprocity as suggesting unconstitutional condi-
tions on constitutional rights, including Justice Scalia in Citizens United. I 
view the problem in light of the rationale for corporate constitutional 
standing, which exists in the first place because corporations may litigate 
regulations that apply to them, and then they may or may not be able to 
assert a constitutional defense to the regulation. In constitutional cases, a 
corporation does not represent the constitutional rights of individuals; only 
an association, or perhaps a nonprofit or religious organization serving a 
similar role, may do so. Similarly in criminal cases, corporate criminal 
liability is intended to hold corporations accountable, in order to make 
criminal laws effective in their enforcement, and concerns of the effective-
ness animate the interpretation of underlying constitutional criminal 
procedure rights. 
The Supreme Court’s ruling that corporations may be criminally prose-
cuted in New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States 
emphasized that the acts of an employee should be imputed to the corpora-
tion for entirely consequentialist reasons.319 New York Central buttresses a 
consequentialist account of organizational standing. There, the railroad’s 
managers had offered rebates to sugar refining companies on railroad freight 
rates, in violation of the Elkins Act, which prohibited such special treatment 
in railroad rates.320 The Act included a provision creating liability for a 
 
316 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973). 
317 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950). 
318 Andrew E. Taslitz, Reciprocity and the Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 41 STETSON 
L. REV. 73, 95 (2011). 
319 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909). 
320 Id. at 489. 
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corporation under a respondeat superior standard adopted from tort law, in 
which the entity’s liability is derivative of the crime of an employee.321 In 
other words, the corporation was strictly liable for a crime by an employee 
acting within the scope of employment.  
The Supreme Court upheld the statute, citing to “the interest of public 
policy.”322 Corporate criminal liability makes regulation more effective. 
Quoting a criminal law treatise, the Court said: “If, for example, the invisible, 
intangible essence of air, which we term a corporation, can level mountains, 
fill up valleys, lay down iron tracks, and run railroad cars on them, it can 
intend to do it, and can act therein as well viciously as virtuously.”323 
The Court explained there might be some crimes that cannot be com-
mitted by corporations, but a range of statutory regulatory offenses can 
readily be applied to corporations to make the regulation more effective: 
It is a part of the public history of the times that statutes against rebates 
could not be effectually enforced so long as individuals only were subject to 
punishment for violation of the law, when the giving of rebates or concessions 
enured to the benefit of the corporations of which the individuals were but 
the instruments. This situation, developed in more than one report of the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, was no doubt influential in bringing 
about the enactment of the Elkins Law, making corporations criminally 
liable.324 
The Court concluded in still stronger language that to give corporations 
“immunity” from responsibility for crimes “because of the old and exploded 
doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would virtually take 
away the only means of effectually controlling the subject-matter and 
correcting the abuses aimed at.”325 Thus, the Court approved as constitu-
tional a statute holding a corporation separately criminally liable, but 
derivatively, for the acts of officers or employees in the scope of their duties. 
That respondeat superior standard now applies in federal criminal cases. 
In both civil rights and criminal cases, a corporation can provide a con-
venient litigation unit. For an example, take the 1910 case J. J. McCaskill Co. 
v. United States, in which the Supreme Court dealt with the status of 
corporations as property holders in a dispute about a federal land patent 
deeded to a homesteader, acting as a corporate agent, who conveyed the 
 
321 Id. at 491. 
322 Id. at 494. 
323 Id. at 493. 
324 Id. at 495. 
325 Id. at 496. 
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land to the corporation.326 The Court cited to corporate law principles and 
noted “[a] growing tendency is therefore exhibited in the courts to look 
beyond the corporate form to the purpose of it and to the officers who are 
identified with that purpose.”327 While acts and knowledge of employees 
may not always be attributed to the corporation, this agent was not an 
“innocent purchaser,” and criminal law need not “enable the corporation to 
become a means of fraud or a means to evade its responsibilities.”328  
The Supreme Court relied on the respondeat superior rule that a corpo-
ration is bound by acts of its agents. There is no converse relationship; the 
corporation cannot vindicate rights on behalf of individuals. Constitutional 
criminal procedure in particular sheds light on something else about the 
constitutional status of corporations: permitting corporations to assert 
constitutional rights does not necessarily insulate them from government 
power but can flow from how they may be the direct targets of civil and 
criminal enforcement. Thus, during criminal trials, in which corporations 
and employees may be jointly prosecuted, extending constitutional rights to 
corporations permits them to present a separate defense. In that defensive 
context, extending constitutional rights to corporations may not only 
protect the fairness of adversary proceedings, but also can enable corpora-
tions to trade on their rights to obtain leniency with prosecutors by cooperating 
to ensure that individual wrongdoers are punished.329 
IV. THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
This Part turns to the areas in which constitutional rights of corpora-
tions could be reconsidered, as well as the need to examine more carefully 
the adequacy of organizational standing to assert constitutional rights on 
behalf of others. Finally, I conclude by discussing an extremely broad 
question: the possible impact of the Supreme Court’s evolving approach 
toward corporate constitutional standing on constitutional litigation gener-
ally and on the substance of constitutional rights. 
 
326 216 U.S. 504, 505 (1910). 
327 Id. at 515. 
328 Id. at 514-15. 
329 For a detailed treatment of corporate criminal litigation, prosecution practices, and possible 
conflicts with employees during such litigation, as well as evidence concerning how often 
prosecutors successfully rely on corporate cooperation in order to prosecute employees and 
officers, see generally GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL, supra note 175. 
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A. Reconsidering Constitutional Non-Protection of Corporations 
I argue that in several of its rulings on the constitutional rights of corpo-
rations, the Supreme Court has it wrong. Each area is far less prominent 
than Citizens United or Hobby Lobby. In that context, I have argued that a 
for-profit corporation cannot assert derivatively the free exercise or con-
science rights of owners, particularly given conflicts with rights of employees. 
The separate cost of complying with the regulation is not the constitutional 
injury that the First Amendment protects, and regardless, neither corpora-
tions nor associations can litigate the rights of constituent owners or 
employees, although an association or religious organization can litigate on 
behalf of members.  
In addition, I argue the Supreme Court should reconsider its Fifth 
Amendment “collective entity” decisions. The lack of a corporate Fifth 
Amendment right can directly impact the rights of individual employees. 
The Court reasoned in Braswell v. United States that as corporate officers 
serving in that capacity, an employee cannot assert Fifth Amendment 
privilege on behalf of the corporation, even in the situation in which 
complying might be incriminating.330 Justice Kennedy dissented in Braswell, 
citing the concern that individuals can be personally incriminated for 
refusing to comply with corporate subpoenas.331 However, even in that 
dissent, Justice Kennedy affirmed the general principle that corporations 
lack Fifth Amendment rights, noting: 
Our long course of decisions concerning artificial entities and the 
Fifth Amendment served us well. It illuminated two of the critical 
foundations for the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination: first, that it is an explicit right of a natural person, 
protecting the realm of human thought and expression; second, that 
it is confined to governmental compulsion.332 
The general principle may not be as important as the Braswell Court 
suggested. Suppose the Supreme Court reversed Hale v. Henkel. Matters 
would not change dramatically since, as noted, the Court has held that 
business records themselves are not testimonial, and thus there could be no 
 
330 487 U.S. 99, 110 (1988). 
331  See id. at 128 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Scott D. Price, Note, Braswell v. United 
States: An Examination of a Custodian’s Fifth Amendment Right to Avoid Personal Production of 
Corporate Records, 34 VILL. L. REV. 353, 379-80 (1989) (detailing the concerns with subpoenas of 
businesses implicating personal Fifth Amendment rights discussed in Justice Kennedy’s dissent in 
Braswell). 
332 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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Fifth Amendment objection to the demand for their production by a 
corporation.333 Neither individuals nor the corporation could object to the 
production of business records unless the person being asked to produce the 
records could self-incriminate through the act of production. By designating 
another officer to produce the records, there could be no legitimate objec-
tion to a subpoena request. 
In a far more obscure area, some courts hold corporations lack Sixth 
Amendment rights to have an adequate defense lawyer represent them in a 
criminal matter. Circuits are split on whether corporations have a right to 
adequate defense counsel, which individuals undoubtedly retain.334 I see it 
as a straightforward question, with a different answer. Because corporations 
may be separately prosecuted for crimes of employees, they are entitled to 
have counsel represent them when they stand in for aggregate interests not 
adequately represented by those of employee-defendants and that may 
outright conflict with employees charged with crimes (and after all, organi-
zations cannot represent themselves pro se). Organizations should therefore 
be entitled to the basic assurances of a fair trial, including the Sixth 
Amendment right to adequate representation by defense counsel.  
B. Organizational Rights Taxonomies 
The most prominent alternative approach to theorizing more broadly 
about the constitutional rights of corporations is Professor Meir Dan-Cohen’s 
approach, which resembles in its general outlines that of the Supreme Court 
in its pre–Citizens United corporate speech cases.335 Dan-Cohen created a 
rich and detailed taxonomy of types of organizations that indicates whether 
a particular organization is of the type that should enjoy a particular consti-
tutional protection.336 While an admirable and useful approach, I have 
argued it is unnecessarily complex from the perspective of the existing tests 
for organizational and associational standing. That said, the distinctions that 
 
333 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). 
334 Compare United States v. Rad-O-Lite of Phila., Inc., 612 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(“[A]n accused has no less of a need for effective assistance due to the fact that it is a corpora-
tion.”), and Am. Airways Charters, Inc. v. Regan, 746 F.2d 865, 873 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“It 
appears beyond sensible debate that corporations, in our society, do indeed enjoy the right to 
retain counsel.”), with United States v. Unimex, Inc., 991 F.2d 546, 550 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Being 
incorporeal, corporations cannot be imprisoned, so they have no constitutional right to appointed 
counsel.”), and United States v. Hartsell, 127 F.3d 343, 350 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding “no suggestion” 
that corporations are entitled to publicly appointed counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A). 
335 See generally MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL 
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986). 
336 See generally id. 
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Dan-Cohen explores do matter, and they help to explain why organizational 
standing is different as between corporations and associations; standing is 
neither unrestricted nor entirely indifferent to the type of organization and 
the type of constitutional injury litigated. In any number of cases, an 
association may diverge from the interests of members, whether due to the 
particular constitutional right being litigated or the posture of the litigation. 
As discussed, for-profit corporations typically lack standing to litigate on 
behalf of individuals (and if one did so in a case involving money damages, 
individuals might not be bound by the result). 
Due to the manner in which the Supreme Court defined the underlying 
substance of the speech right in Citizens United, the type and form of the 
organization did not affect the standing analysis. A for-profit corporation, 
unlike the nonprofit at issue in Citizens United, would not typically represent 
effectively or adequately the interests of individuals for whom the constitu-
tional right is intended to protect. James Nelson has forcefully and convinc-
ingly argued, for example, that for-profit entities should not have standing 
to litigate First Amendment right of conscience claims, but the Court did 
not, unfortunately, carefully engage with his argument in the Hobby Lobby 
ruling.337 Corporations lack the ability to assert liberty rights under the Due 
Process Clauses, for reasons that can be articulated in standing terms, and 
prior to Hobby Lobby, one would have supposed religious liberty was 
something “personal” for which business corporations, at least, would not be 
adequate representatives for purposes of litigation, while nonprofits and 
associations should be treated differently under standing law, as I have 
described. 
What the Supreme Court has not carefully defined in associational 
standing case law is what threshold of adequacy permits the association to 
assert an injury on behalf of its constituents, members, or other individuals. 
While Rule 23 standards for civil class action litigation are not adapted to 
those ends, they provide an area in which the Court has engaged (and 
controversially so) with questions concerning adequacy of representation of 
a group of individuals in litigation. The Court has not done the same in 
associational standing cases, except to note that adequacy concerns and 
prudential concerns exist, and by implication, to decline to recognize 
 
337 See James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1609-10 (arguing 
that for-profit corporations are usually not connected to individual members and so should not be 
able to assert free exercise claims). Nelson also provides an excellent discussion of treatment of 
close corporations, noting that the shareholder wealth maximization norm or fiduciary duty norms 
apply to close corporations as well. See id. at 1591-95 (arguing that close corporations also foster 
detachment because they are bound by fiduciary duty norms). 
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standing of organizations to litigate certain constitutional rights.338 In 
addition, the Supreme Court has been highly reluctant to examine whether 
an association is an adequate proxy for the interests of its members: most 
notably in cases involving challenges to political parties and their primaries. 
The Court has emphasized deference to political parties in the design of 
their voting procedures,339 although the assumption that political parties are 
defined private organizations that deserve such deference, or have “rights” 
as part of the electoral process, has been criticized.340 
A clearer standard should be developed, focusing on whether the sub-
stantive constitutional right can be adequately and effectively litigated by 
the association. If it is a corporation, then its structure permits standing to 
litigate concrete interests of the entity to improve its profitability, but not 
on behalf of other constituents. If it is an association, then it may litigate on 
behalf of injury to members. Individual officers or employees require 
separate representation and litigation because their rights are distinct. In 
addition, a conflict between rights of individuals should tend to bar associa-
tional standing, and the benefits to the group from organizational litigation 
should predominate or outweigh any concerns regarding issues better 
litigated individually, just as in class action litigation. Whether added 
precision can be supplied to the tests for associational and organizational 
standing I leave to future work. Given the manner in which the lower courts 
had divided over the questions pre–Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court will 
likely have to attend to these important questions in the future. 
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C. Individualized and Group-Based Constitutional Rights 
Does theorizing corporate constitutional rights require an account of 
group rights? Some argue it is improper to reach decisions about constitu-
tional rights “in terms of the rights of corporate persons.”341 I have argued 
that the Supreme Court does not do so and need not do so. Organizations 
and corporations have standing to assert rights only as a defense to regulation 
that affects the economic interests of the entity; by contrast, associations 
and nonprofits can represent the rights of members or constituents. The 
Court carefully avoids interpreting rights as different based on the artificial 
nature of the defendant. That said, one reason that so many constitutional 
rights are readily amenable to corporate litigation is in part because so many 
constitutional rights are not strictly personal and instead apply generally, 
whether conceived as duties of government or privileges against govern-
ment conduct and regulation.342 In a sense, no criminal procedure rights are 
purely personal since they are defined generally as immunities from certain 
government investigation or prosecution conduct.343  
Due process and other Bill of Rights protections may safeguard individual 
rights, but at a highly general level of abstraction the Court typically 
balances the state’s interests against fundamental interests of individuals. 
Corporations and organizations may be perfectly able to assert those 
interests on behalf of the organization’s interests, and many regulations 
impacting individual rights may also cause injury to organizations, including 
business organizations. Ideological organizations may be little different than 
ideological individual plaintiffs.344 Indeed, broader definitions of constitu-
tional rights may create more opportunity for non-business citizens groups 
to assert constitutional challenges, and doing so may improve the quality of 
constitutional litigation.345 Highly individualized or context-specific 
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constitutional rules may not help many individuals, as I have argued 
elsewhere,346 and tend to frustrate aggregate litigation of constitutional 
rights, including by organizations.  
On the other hand, those more generalized rights may do a poor job of 
protecting individuals from harm, recognizing individual dignity interests, 
or remedying the particular circumstances of individual rights violations.347 
There is a real tradeoff between the general and the individual. General 
rights may lead to higher quality constitutional litigation, but they may 
more poorly capture individual dignitary values. Where recognizing general 
rights outright conflicts with individual rights, though, the problem of 
corporate constitutional standing becomes particularly acute. 
CONCLUSION 
Is the problem with recognizing corporate constitutional rights that cor-
porations can abuse their rights to frustrate important regulations or 
criminal law enforcement as Professor Peter Henning has forcefully 
argued?348 Or is the problem that corporations simply are not appropriate 
vehicles for individual rights? I argue corporations are, more often than 
appreciated, appropriate constitutional litigators. Whether the substance of 
any particular constitutional right should be interpreted in a way that 
privileges business organizations is a separate question, which can raise 
profound grounds for disagreement. But it is a preliminary question, 
separate from the merits, whether an organization has Article III standing 
to assert constitutional rights on its own behalf. The standing analysis 
provides important tools—distinct from the merits inquiry—to evaluate 
whether a corporation, as opposed to an association, can litigate a given 
constitutional injury. 
Taking account of the doctrine through the lens of Article III, there has 
been some rhyme to the Supreme Court’s varying reasons for denying or 
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granting corporate constitutional rights. Far from being ad hoc or formulaic, 
I argue that the Court’s approach toward recognizing constitutional rights 
for corporations and other organizations, including associations, can be 
understood to reflect a coherent if not consistent expressed view of when an 
organization can exercise constitutional rights on behalf of others—
although, to be sure, I have identified important areas in which prior rulings 
should be reconsidered. Most troubling, in its Hobby Lobby ruling, the Court 
did not directly address Article III standing and appeared to cast to the side 
each of the relevant distinctions in the existing doctrine.  
Organizations, including corporations, long have had Article III standing 
to challenge government acts harming the entity’s interests. In contrast, 
associations have long litigated constitutional rights affecting rights of 
individual members. Religious organizations have long litigated on behalf of 
the beliefs of their members. Courts have recognized how such groups can 
bring more resources and better representation to constitutional litigation. 
For rights tied to citizenship or purely individual subject matter, or where 
organizations’ interests are in conflict with or do not adequately represent 
individuals, however, an organization should lack standing to litigate.  
The substance of a particular constitutional right may benefit some 
types of organizations more than others, just as some individuals might be 
more affected by an interpretation of constitutional doctrine, given individual 
preferences and actions. But constitutional rules of recognition should be 
drawn broadly and evenhandedly. One might fully disagree with ways that 
the Court interprets the substance of particular constitutional rights after 
having decided to give an organization standing to litigate. Still more 
controversial aspects of the Court’s rulings, such as in Citizens United, have 
to do with a business-friendly understanding of the First Amendment 
equating money with speech—not with the recognition of corporate consti-
tutional standing. Adopting a consequentialist appreciation that constitu-
tional standing of organizations accomplishes practical goals does not mean 
that the substance of constitutional rights should be interpreted solely or 
even partially based on consequences. The fact that an organization has 
standing to assert a constitutional right does not mean that it will obtain 
relief on the merits.  
Nor should courts ignore questions of individual rights that flow from 
permitting organizational litigation. I have argued that due process and 
prudential concerns with organizational and associational standing must be 
far more carefully scrutinized—just as the Supreme Court can be zealous in 
policing due process in class action litigation. In Hobby Lobby, not only was 
Article III standing ignored, all the while equating religious beliefs of 
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owners with that of a for-profit corporation, but the effect on third-party 
employees and dependents was not carefully considered either. Associations 
lay a broader claim to represent the interests of members, but the Court has 
been clear that even for such an organization, standing requires more than 
just an “interest in a problem.”349 Apart from the substance of constitutional 
rights, if the goal of permitting corporate constitutional litigation is to make 
litigation of the underlying constitutional rights more effective, then 
tension between individual and organizational rights, or failure of the 
organization to adequately represent its constituents, should be carefully 
scrutinized for due process violations or prudential considerations counseling 
against standing.  
Chief Justice John Marshall called a corporation “an artificial being, in-
visible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”350 That is 
precisely why judges must carefully examine whether an organization has 
Article III standing to litigate constitutional rights. If in the past standing 
doctrine has been “one of the most criticized aspects of constitutional law,” 
then a selective application of that doctrine raises still more cause for 
concern.351 A central lesson from the jurisprudence of constitutional litiga-
tion by organizations—perhaps sobering to those who value the individual’s 
day in court—is that constitutional rights may be at their strongest when 
non-individualized and readily litigated by groups and not just individuals. 
Conversely, the cost of allowing an “artificial being,” an organization, to 
assert rights at the expense of individuals or without adequately representing 
individuals can be too great for a constitutional democracy to permit. As the 
Court has stated, the law of standing “is founded in concern about the 
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”352 
A focus on the constitutional standing of organizations serves to ensure that 
artificial entities themselves play a valuable and proper, but limited, role in 
our democratic society. 
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